Buffer Overflow Attacks Explained (with Examples)

Serious buffer overflow vulnerability found in Bitcoin XT. If you are running XT from git shut off and upgrade!!!

Serious buffer overflow vulnerability found in Bitcoin XT. If you are running XT from git shut off and upgrade!!! submitted by ReKTnode to bitcoinxt [link] [comments]

Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in miniupnp. CPP-ethereum affected? (Post from /r/bitcoin)

submitted by throwaway36256 to ethereum [link] [comments]

Buffer overflow exploit found in Bitcoin XT that allows for the DoS of nodes.

Buffer overflow exploit found in Bitcoin XT that allows for the DoS of nodes. submitted by DrugieDineros to btc [link] [comments]

Serious buffer overflow vulnerability found in Bitcoin XT. If you are running XT from git shut off and upgrade!!!

Serious buffer overflow vulnerability found in Bitcoin XT. If you are running XT from git shut off and upgrade!!! submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Buffer overflow exploit found in Bitcoin XT that allows for the DoS of nodes.

Buffer overflow exploit found in Bitcoin XT that allows for the DoS of nodes. submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

College Education Resources

Not a complete list, but somewhere to start
United States
submitted by chrisknight1985 to cybersecurity [link] [comments]

Bitcoin attack, ‘Corebleed,’ demonstrates the need for node decentralisation

Bitcoin attack, ‘Corebleed,’ demonstrates the need for node decentralisation submitted by Lukovka to btc [link] [comments]

Trojan malscripts; **what are they?**

in this post you will learn a little about publicly available information on malscripts
what is a trojan.malscript? -a quick google search turns up this result from 2014 (outdated?)
Search Results (Featured snippet from the web) Systems Affected: Windows - Trojan. Malscript is a heuristic detection for Web-based malicious script files that exploit vulnerabilities and/or perform heap spraying.-Sep 3, 2014- -Trojan.Malscript | Symantec- -https://www.symantec.com › security-center › writeup-
-not very clear!... lets try learn some more!!.. *another quick google search gives up some information about other systems not just windows affected
-If we add keywords like linux we get varied results such as this (albeit, older but w/e)
Search Results (Featured snippet from the web) -Systems Affected: Linux, Mac, Solaris, Windows.- Trojan. Malscript. C is a generic detection for HTML files infected with a JavaScript that redirects the browser to a malicious Web site that may exploit the browser or download other malicious threats.-Jan 30, 2010- -Trojan.Malscript.C | Technical Details | Removing Help ...- -https://us.norton.com › trojan.malscript.c-2010-013011-2940-99-writeup.html-
so given a couple quick searches we can guess a bit -we need: *java *HTML *access to the internet somehow (could be by an offline file touching an online source; this puts the item at risk for "contracting" offline ai or crawling codes)
another way would be
*write a "safe" code on here on reddit but its gonna take me time since reddit allows this:
if 1 * 2 < 3: print "hello, world!" 
this can be achieved by possibly writing a code to a site that had malscripts already deployed such as an embed code, or request in an "iframe"
  • Alot of people may remember sites such as:
https://www.xanga.com and various other places; *these places allowed HTML editing for themes and overall page layout -sites such as http://www.neopets.com etc. had/have this ability as well.

-these sites are great examples of how easy it could be to place an HTML or java malscript that was made to either be good/bad/both; especially now, given our extremely large usage of internet!
Sure; #scareme... what can a trojan.malscript do!
quick learned facts:
-exploits an available resource via internets (lol)
-is a form of 'script' (really generic term) that employs heuristic based approach; defined as and asked to google before:
What is a heuristic approach?- -“A heuristic technique, often called simply a heuristic, is any approach to problem solving, learning, or discovery that employs a practical method not guaranteed to be optimal or perfect, but sufficient for the immediate goals.-Feb 5, 2018- -Heuristic Approaches to Problem Solving- | -101 Computing- -https://www.101computing.net › heuristic-approaches-to-problem-solving-
-may perfrom heap spraying which is defined here
A heap spraying attack is a remote code execution exploit that allows the attacker to insert arbitrary code in the system's heap memory space. ... The spray is followed by exploit code that, when inserted into the heap memory, will exploit a weakness or vulnerability, allowing the code to execute on the system.-Aug 11, 2010- -Heap Spraying Buffer Overflow Attacks - Cisco.com- -https://tools.cisco.com › center › resources › security-alerts-announcement-
WAIT! isnt that good...or bad...or OMG wth! #notscared?scared?
it really depends 0.o
-why is there a malscript in the first place; this is a great place to start asking questions for any individual or business by asking what OS is being used and what version/type/grade/blahblah
I use windows xp, windows xp is a "unsupported"(mostly) os - I use it to dissect information. its wonderful! also sucks sometimes when the software is riddled with holes and various other "things" shoutout to Microsoft for updates in DEC 2019! x<.3
Windows xp pro sp3 5.1.2600
x86
smbios2.4
I use AVG anti-virus with highest settings and personal settings that the free version can have
get to know my computer better? #thisajoke??
Nah, over the years Ive collected knowledge and some more common answers to basic questions in cyber security, qustions like "what is a malscript"? have simple answers, mostly... things like these 5 objects can be defined as being malscript:
  • Anti-virus
  • Anti-malware
  • anti-execution mechanisms
  • any word processor may or may not be defined as malscript if it can "spell check" your work or place a timestamp
  • third party input/output mechanism; things such as mouses, sd, usb, cd, internet(s) that crawl for information like web.archive, bitcoin code, cryptocode overall if it has a weakness to malscripted behaviours
there are MULTIPLE other reasons, one such problem is:
mass-malware campaigns and adware from older computers attempting to propogate and control older versions of networks that no longer work as expected/coded to seek
^ this type of malscript "poorly planned, and hastily executed or outdated"; can have adverse impacts on the internet as a whole - not just for the computers expected to be impacted.
ok, malscripts. so what can #I do?
when approaching cyber security its easy to become overwhelmed by the amount of information that is available; to research; to dissect; to use as examples...
what the best thing anyone or a group can do?;
attempt to make an effort to learn about the item a bit before, using or expecting them to work a certain way; due to a biased info source like ones own
also:
seek outside sources, but also be careful an use knowledge seeked as knowledge that may or may not be "useful" for the current project or situation...
this post was an attempt to gain knowledge and some skills in writing and information sharing.
thanks everyone!
hope you enjoy my reading material!!
Have a Awwww-some new year!
ReachOutForBits recommends "useless" backup scanning after securely and safely removing identifiable information before scanning at https://www.virustotal.com before resell of computer or devices ; in order to avoid costly data blunders such as
ids/creds cloning
phonenumber collection
email collection
by persistent threats that are EXTREMELY HARD TO DETECT ; even penetrating some hardwares with advanced capabilities such as "sleeping" AI or, Run-mocking AI!
think of all the people who said AI will skynet us; maybe AI is just a stepping stone for some BAD F-IN MALWARE that someone has written that needs no C&C mechanism or user interaction at all - not the AI itself persay.
this is one form of persistant threat that needs to be identified to ensure non-tainted, verifiable, security information results into the future and beyond...
other threats include:
  • over-patriotic; otherwise defined as "EXTREMIST" - individuals of ANY COUNTRY, ANY RELIGION, ANY CREED, ANY BELIEF or OATH or CONSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT.
  • fake bomb threats and faux-emergency calls
  • PAID INFORMANTS AND THEIR COUNTERPARTS
  • So called, anons, that gather in groups and communicate between each-other; effectively destroying the meaning of being ANON. singular noun
    the types of people(s) that write their own definition at urbandictionary and then proceed to agree together that thats it.
    • ahha, hah..hahahah...this is funnny....get this:
    -they also gather en-masse in attempts to overwhelm and proceed to cause irreprible cost or some form of damage - rarely peaceful anymore.
names like troll are no longer what they were, fictional characters under a bridge; troll is now Pseudonym for prankster(s) @ anycost
  • Crypto-currency Jackers who have designed tech to prevent proper payments and reward systems (at-source or in-transit) from being implemented; according to consensus.
  • Outdated, over-sourced(more than 10 downloads) malware
  • Junk and bloat that often comes preinstalled with no intention of caring whether or not the user will actually "use" it.
    this type of item hogs CPU/GPU and introduces ill timed updates that cannot be controlled!
STAY SAFE
submitted by killabell33 to MinimalistHacking [link] [comments]

If you like watching tutorials to learn! Dump of Hacking/Programming Courses (Pluralsight.com, Coursera, Lynda.com)

 /\ / \ _ __ ___ _ __ _ _ _ __ ___ ___ _ _ ___ / /\ \ | '_ \ / _ \| '_ \| | | | '_ ` _ \ / _ \| | | / __| / ____ \| | | | (_) | | | | |_| | | | | | | (_) | |_| \__ \ /_/ \_\_| |_|\___/|_| |_|\__, |_| |_| |_|\___/ \__,_|___/ __/ | |___/ 
Courses pirated & dumped by Case & S1rlancelot
irc.anonops.com/6697
#learninghub
* This series of videocourses will guide you through the core material that an entry-level "ethical" hacker needs.
* Go to pluralsight.com (most links here are from there) and search the course if you want to see the table of contents.
* You may want to use a media player that allows you to increase the speed of the videos
* The number does not mean the order in which you should follow the courses, its just the order in which they were added.
* Use ?desc to check the description of a course. Eg: ?desc 81
* Special thanks to ClaudiaD who haxed her way and made downloading the videos a lot easier, you rock. I also reused the code of her IRC bot which lead to the birth of SexyTeacherBot. Thanks ;)
* Special thanks to S1rlancelot who has also dumped a great deal of courses as well and helps more than I could ever ask for in #learninghub and is also leet as fuck

Don't know where to start? <----------------------------------------------------------------------- Don't know where to start? <------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-> BEGINNERS MUST WATCH: 10,000 foot view of penetration testing: 81. http://www.mediafire.com/download/b71c8v6tbqxzure/Introduction+to+Pentesting.rar

-> The top 10 OWASP vulnerabilities explained & exploited. Good for getting a big picture of present day web hacking: 2. http://www.mediafire.com/download/zodyqcqoecka4yi/Web+Security+and+the+OWASP+Top+10%3B+The+Big+Picture.rar

-> A ~9 hour long course on website vulnerabilities and how to exploit/secure them: 1. http://www.mediafire.com/download/7dgfkktgyxlqx5u/Hack+Yourself+First%3B+How+to+go+on+the+Cyber-Offense.rar (Hack Yourself First; How to go on the Cyber-Offense)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The rest of the courses listed below will go deeper into each step of hacking and the different attack techniques. <-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

*** IF YOU FEEL THAT YOU NEED TO KNOW MORE BASICS ABOUT COMPUTERS BEFORE GETTING TO HACKING CHECK BELOW WHERE IT SAYS "BASIC STUFF ABOUT COMPUTERS YOU SHOULD KNOW"
*** IT IS ADVISED THAT YOU LEARN A LOW LEVEL PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE SUCH AS C++ BEFORE GETTING TO HACK
*** TRY NOT TO GET OVERWHELMED BY THE AMOUNT OF CONTENT!!

# EC-Council's Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH)
  1. http://www.mediafire.com/download/5tex1gndiis0rz3/Reconnaissance+-+Footprinting.rar -- Reconnaissance/Footprinting
  2. http://www.mediafire.com/download/1bap7hf82clm9dy/SQL+Injection.rar-- SQL Injection
  3. http://www.mediafire.com/download/22t74lyof149u41/Scanning+networks.rar-- Scanning Networks
  4. http://www.mediafire.com/download/h285291nt7w8trh/Enumeration.rar-- Enumeration
  5. http://www.mediafire.com/download/g4di658xb9stz8g/Pentesting+Web+Servers.rar -- Hacking Web Servers
  6. http://www.mediafire.com/download/waqslt6jhk6ph1a/Pentesting+Web+Applications.rar -- Hacking Web Applications
  7. http://www.mediafire.com/download/1cujirp51m911k8/Cryptography.rar-- Cryptography
  8. http://www.mediafire.com/download/fzbq3zzzqspzw15/Sniffing.rar-- Sniffing
  9. http://www.mediafire.com/download/5irzrhub4r6mva3/Session+Hijacking.rar-- Session Hijacking
  10. http://www.mediafire.com/download/2xqgt9g7044n683/Social+Engineering.rar-- Social Engineering
  11. http://www.mediafire.com/download/zf2d20969azd887/System+hacking.rar-- System Hacking
  12. http://www.mediafire.com/download/x5zxdvv1h3k54nk/Denial+of+Service.rar-- Denial of Service
  13. http://www.mediafire.com/download/r9hrz8zotis74f1/Hacking+wireless+networks.rar -- Hacking Wireless Networks
  14. http://www.mediafire.com/download/8caooodccdnc608/Malware+threats.rar-- Malware Threats
  15. http://www.mediafire.com/download/33z5epburhu1xgy/Evading+IDS%2C+Firewalls%2C+and+Honeypots.rar-- Evading IDS, Firewalls, and Honeypots
  16. http://www.mediafire.com/download/l45v3ne52qr9llw/Mobile+platforms.rar-- Hacking Mobile Platforms

# More hacking courses
  1. http://www.mediafire.com/download/492h7o887yxexha/PT+and+EH+with+Kali+Linux.rar-- Introduction to Pentesting and Ethical Hacking with Kali Linux
    1. http://www.mediafire.com/download/2kczrn29gt6fdp3/Introduction+to+Firewalls.rar -- Introduction to Firewalls
    2. http://www.mediafire.com/download/t98r47bpo9hy5n1/Introduction+to+browser+security+headers.rar-- Introduction to browser security headers
    3. http://www.mediafire.com/download/ou45m7o4xqt1qdu/Introduction+to+Wireshark.rar -- Introduction to Wireshark
    4. http://www.mediafire.com/download/n5exc1bomahud9m/Troubleshooting+with+Wireshark+Fundamental+Protocol+Analysis.rar -- Troubleshooting with Wireshark
    5. http://www.mediafire.com/download/n98viipaz131fhq/Wireshark+2.0.rar-- Wireshark 2.0
    6. http://www.mediafire.com/download/3guhkfrhfbvs01b/NMAP.rar-- Network Security Testing with Nmap
    7. http://www.mediafire.com/download/sbst1evvisywe62/Buffer+Overflow.rar -- All about buffer overflows
    8. http://www.mediafire.com/download/7rq1ujn9424d3hb/Network+PT+Using+Python+and+K_4li+Linux.rar-- Network Pentesting using Python and Kali linux
    9. http://www.mediafire.com/download/mnulcdbw817f9q0/Metasploit+Basics.rar-- Metasploit Basics
    10. http://www.mediafire.com/download/qchaazzxrdsmwja/CloudFlare+Security.rar-- CloudFlare Security
    11. http://www.mediafire.com/download/1qqm5pcj6pz37wn/Hack+your+API+First.rar -- Hack your API first
    12. http://www.mediafire.com/download/roaeau041zx8byx/SSCP%3B+Risk+Identification%2C+Monitoring%2C+and+Analysis.rar -- SSCP: Risk Identification, Monitoring, and Analysis
    13. http://www.mediafire.com/download/ysvx972ymd57gme/Check+Point+Certified+Security+Administrator%3B+Install+%26+Deploy.rar-- Check Point Certified Security Administrator; Install & Deploy
    14. http://www.mediafire.com/download/ka9qu9136x8on4j/Cloud+security.rar -- Cloud Security
    15. http://www.mediafire.com/download/6ctvkguxr9g4609/Cloud+computing.rar -- Cloud Computing
    16. http://www.mediafire.com/download/5ut59in0l6okeaq/Introduction+to+Penetration+Testing+Using+Metasploit.rar -- Introduction to Pentesting using Metasploit

# Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator (CHFI)
  1. http://www.mediafire.com/file/yinvs2vtn4ix9z0/CHFI_Module_1_Introduction.rar —- Module 1 Introduction
  2. http://www.mediafire.com/file/9yai0s961xkb7p3/CHFI_Module_2_Forensics_Investigation_Process.rar —- Module 2 Forensics & Investigation Process
  3. http://www.mediafire.com/file/l16n7as0zc5fgb4/CHFI_Module_3_Searching_%26_Seizing.rar —- Module 3 Searching & Seizing
  4. http://www.mediafire.com/file/3ajk8erktw1a4ug/CHFI_Module_4_Digital_Evidence%282%29.rar —- Module 4 Digital Evidence
  5. http://www.mediafire.com/file/8oarrkysj2pyymo/CHFI_Module_5_Responder_Procedures.rar —- Module 5 Responder Procedures
  6. http://www.mediafire.com/file/jqqoiy6ko91ov5c/CHFI_Module_6_Forensic_Lab.rar —- Module 6 Forensic Lab
  7. http://www.mediafire.com/file/unk51i52idt53ay/CHFI_Module_7_Hard_Disks_%26__File_Systems.rar—- Module 7 Hard Disks & File Systems
  8. http://www.mediafire.com/file/6azb12untw5itww/CHFI_Module_8_Windows_Forensics.rar —- Module 8 Windows Forensics
  9. http://www.mediafire.com/file/3dzf4qdln3pn6qi/CHFI_Module_9_Data_Acquisition_and_Duplication.rar —- Module 9 Data Akquisition & Duplication
  10. http://www.mediafire.com/file/ifl18p77a10c2az/CHFI_Module_10_Recovering_Deleted_Files_and_Partitions.rar —- Module 10 Recovering deleted Files & & partitions
  11. http://www.mediafire.com/file/2zabeg7axi7cwdd/CHFI_Module_11_Using_Access_Data_FTK.rar —- Module 11 Using Access Data FTK
  12. http://www.mediafire.com/file/m1nop2yk6pwsvn0/CHFI_Module_12_Using_EnCase.rar —- Module 12 Using EnCase
  13. http://www.mediafire.com/file/5aay0ed5uzt8y97/CHFI_Module_13_Steganography.rar —- Module 13 Steganography
  14. http://www.mediafire.com/file/k16714g10alwwkb/CHFI_Module_14_Password_Crackers.rar —- Module 14 Password Crackers
  15. http://www.mediafire.com/file/990ili11icinm5c/CHFI_Module_15_Log_Correlation.rar —- Module 15 Log Correlation
  16. http://www.mediafire.com/file/qsrr2yn0ptreyre/CHFI_Module_16_Network_Forensics.rar —- Module 16 Network Forensics
  17. http://www.mediafire.com/file/ip1ded3iumcr3dg/CHFI_Module_17_Wireless_Attacks.rar —- Module 17 Wireless Attacks
  18. http://www.mediafire.com/file/ldrew3v8x298htu/CHFI_Module_18_Web_Attacks.rar —- Module 18 Web Attacks
  19. http://www.mediafire.com/file/82xh758lt2by927/CHFI_Module_19_Email_Crimes.rar —- Module 19 Email Crimes
  20. http://www.mediafire.com/file/8lu73yi1s79iw1b/CHFI_Module_20_Mobile_Investigation.rar —- Module 20 Mobile Investigation
  21. http://www.mediafire.com/file/jz70shpdzso40ne/CHFI_Module_21_Investigative_Reports.rar —- Module 21 Investigative Reports
  22. http://www.mediafire.com/file/926yco1rhqo2ow2/CHFI_Module_22_Expert_Witness.rar —- Module 22 Expert Witness

# Certified Information Systems Security Pro (CISSP)
  1. http://www.mediafire.com/file/x3zeprhl92pad8v/CISSP_Module_1_Security_and_Risk_Management.rar —- CISSP Module 1 Security and Risk Management
  2. http://www.mediafire.com/file/d9acozildd28f5b/CISSP_Module_2_Asset_Security.rar —- CISSP Module 2 Asset Security
  3. http://www.mediafire.com/file/bn8xf99fe3obo37/CISSP_Module_3_Security_Engineering.rar —- CISSP Module 3 Security Engineering
  4. http://www.mediafire.com/file/znr4pbbbn9qcges/CISSP_Module_4_Communication_and_Network_Security.rar —- CISSP Module 4 Communication and Network Security
  5. http://www.mediafire.com/file/gdppws5602q99m6/CISSP_Module_5_Identity_and_Access_Management.rar —- CISSP Module 5 Identity and Access Management
  6. http://www.mediafire.com/file/wpwwr58ba2cpva3/CISSP_Module_6_Security_Assessment_Testing.ra—- CISSP Module 6 Security Assessment Testing
  7. http://www.mediafire.com/file/1yn1ilhrrxj3ci9/CISSP_Module_7_Security_Operations.rar —- CISSP Module 7 Security Operations
  8. http://www.mediafire.com/file/l35bcalku7d225c/CISSP_Module_8_Software_Development_Security.rar —- CISSP Module 8 Software Development Security

# Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA)
  1. http://www.mediafire.com/file/7cb389z90ajw6zm/CISA_-_Lesson_1.rar—- CISA Lesson 1
  2. http://www.mediafire.com/file/g5ajbgf8prna3kw/CISA_-_Lesson_2.rar—- CISA Lesson 2
  3. http://www.mediafire.com/file/6fosq372h74fm85/CISA_-_Lesson_3.rar—- CISA Lesson 3
  4. http://www.mediafire.com/file/t05o81gzv2r7w3i/CISA_-_Lesson_4.rar—- CISA Lesson 4
  5. http://www.mediafire.com/file/p46jtleg2rj5nhCISA_-_Lesson_5.rar—- CISA Lesson 5
  6. http://www.mediafire.com/file/cpdin9zuk2p349s/CISA_-_Lesson_6.rar—- CISA Lesson 6
  7. http://www.mediafire.com/file/icqjn9oli47k7o3/CISA_-_Lesson_7.rar—- CISA Lesson 7

# Coursera
  1. http://www.mediafire.com/download/mvk782rt6k28yha/Software+Security.rar-- Software Security
  2. http://www.mediafire.com/download/vxd0998dmniuccz/Hardware+Security.rar-- Hardware Security
  3. http://www.mediafire.com/download/mehi7uxazp5f6g6/Bitcoin+and+Cryptocurrency+Technologies+[Princeton+University].7z -- Bitcoin & Cryptocurrency tech, by anominous - thanks!

=== OTHER VIDEO COURSES ===

# Programming
  1. http://www.mediafire.com/download/su02297mbmlxq27/C%2B%2B+Fundamentals.rar-- C++ Fundamentals
  2. http://www.mediafire.com/download/9tgfpx8pzwakrjc/C%2B%2B_Advanced_Topics.rar -- C++ Advanced topics
  3. http://www.mediafire.com/download/com5mg5fda6mwd6/C+Fundamentals.rar -- C Fundamentals
  4. http://www.mediafire.com/download/dzr3d2jymdhdqs6/C+in+Action.rar-- C in Action
  5. http://www.mediafire.com/download/t5rygwbb45izg71/Java+Fundamentals.rar -- Java Fundamentals
  6. http://www.mediafire.com/download/rr8kjao0zaxld3o/JavaScript+from+Scratch.rar -- Javascript from Scratch
  7. http://www.mediafire.com/download/fd9r8hc6u6zouga/SitePoint-Introduction.to.JavaScript.7z -- Introduction to Javascript, by anominous - thanks dude, you rock!
  8. http://www.mediafire.com/download/w37r7339ouih7lg/Introduction+to+HTML+for+Designers.rar -- Introduction to HTML (for designers - you don't really need to be a designer)
  9. http://www.mediafire.com/download/0j09qr98vtbdjab/Introduction+to+jQuery+for+Designers.rar -- Introduction to JQuery
  10. http://www.mediafire.com/download/jj466s79n75ns46/Introduction+to+CSS+for+Designers.rar -- Introduction to CSS
  11. http://www.mediafire.com/download/pvmstcc4abura43/Arduino.rar-- Introduction to Arduino
  12. http://www.mediafire.com/download/sbrgwwksehmz8rc/Angular_Js_-_Get_Started.rar -- Get started with AngularJS
  13. http://www.mediafire.com/download/e5ynwz4th5g3bvo/Building+Angular+and+Node.js+Apps+with+the+MEAN+Stack.rar -- Building Angular and Node JS Apps with the MEAN Stack
  14. http://www.mediafire.com/download/ooulsej4ui421q6/ExtJS+Desktop+Fundamentals.rar -- ExtJS Desktop Fundamentals
  15. http://www.mediafire.com/download/gsc0epd3jvgayfb/Python+Fundamentals.rar -- Python Fundamentals
  16. http://www.mediafire.com/download/dbn6i84zfsb8566/Python_%E2%80%93_Beyond_the_Basics.rar -- Python Beyond the basics
  17. http://www.mediafire.com/file/ucv1l1j9y73i8cc/Django+Fundamentals.rar -- Django Fundamentals
  18. http://www.mediafire.com/download/p9oappfwmb5mdvb/SitePoint-Ruby2.7z -- Ruby 2.0, by anominous - thanks dude!
  19. http://www.mediafire.com/download/9anvrv6dxaaacbn/SitePoint-Getting.Started.with.BackBone.js.7z -- Getting started with BackBone.js, by anominous - thanks dude!
  20. http://www.mediafire.com/download/8b63ljih3cjl426/PowerShell_-_Getting_Started.rar -- Introduction to PowerShell
  21. http://www.mediafire.com/download/sl36dmuomdld4qa/RaspberryPi+HomeServer.rar -- Raspberry Pi Home Server
  22. http://www.mediafire.com/download/5u2g1svecr1iukm/Raspberry+for+Devs.rar -- Raspberry Pi for Developers

# Cisco CCNA Security (640-554)
  1. http://www.mediafire.com/download/yraijpmuzoa1zpn/Cisco+CCNA+Security%3B+Introduction+to+Network+Security.rar -- Introduction to Network Security
  2. http://www.mediafire.com/download/lmj3ri990ou3j64/Cisco_CCNA_Security%3B_AAA_and_IP_Security.rar-- AAA and IP Security
  3. http://www.mediafire.com/download/lhajdkufn9oi5ta/Cisco+CCNA+Security%3B+Firewalls+and+VPNs.rar-- Firewalls and VPNs


## BASIC STUFF ABOUT COMPUTERS YOU SHOULD KNOW

# CompTIA A+ (220-801)
  1. http://www.mediafire.com/download/f5013b98tc40fj8/CompTIA+A%2B+Part+1%3B+Computer+Hardware.rar-- CompTIA A+ Part 1: Computer Hardware
  2. http://www.mediafire.com/download/38q520p66a5a68q/CompTIA+A%2B+Part+2%3B+Networking.rar -- CompTIA A+ Part 2: Networking
  3. http://www.mediafire.com/download/psmkodtkcy440rz/CompTIA+A%2B+Part+3%3B+Peripherals+and+best+practices.rar -- CompTIA A+ Part 3: Peripherals and best practices
  4. http://www.mediafire.com/download/mi3mvleyyd8ayu4/CompTIA+A%2B+Part+4%3B+Operating+Systems.rar-- CompTIA A+ Part 4: Operating System
  5. http://www.mediafire.com/download/5scd91h4gkaefoa/CompTIA+A%2B+Part+5%3B+Mobile+Devices+and+Troubleshooting.rar -- CompTIA A+ Part 5: Mobile Devices and Troubleshooting

# CompTIA Security+ (SY0-401)
  1. http://www.mediafire.com/download/wbdho927tnl1p26/CompTIA+Security%2B.rar -- CompTIA Security+ Domain 1 - Network Security.

# CompTIA Network+ (N10-006)
  1. http://www.mediafire.com/download/2j9vbybrqab3x5q/Network+Architecture+for+CompTIA+Network%2B.rar-- Network Architecture
  2. http://www.mediafire.com/download/y65xsb8n6rfdcp8/Network+Operations+for+CompTIA+Network%2B.rar-- Network Operations
  3. http://www.mediafire.com/download/d4qdr3jwh337033/Network+Security+for+CompTIA+Network%2B.rar-- Network Security

# Linux
  1. http://www.mediafire.com/download/xxz33o4tq1obpzk/Linux+Installation+and+Initial+Configuration.rar-- Linux Installation and Initial Configuration
  2. http://www.mediafire.com/download/i24oogco4ch9ma4/Introduction+to+the+Bash+Shell.rar -- Introduction to the Bash Shell
  3. http://www.mediafire.com/download/t5eha9cr4eckayb/Shell+Scripting+with+Bash.rar -- Shell Scripting with Bash
  4. http://www.mediafire.com/download/27hfeldyqrs2ae8/Linux+Command+Line+Interface+%28CLI%29+Fundamentals.rar -- Linux Command Line Interface Fundamentals

# Video editing
  1. http://www.mediafire.com/download/6pn0jr7nlb7rmc0/Adobe+Premiere+Pro+CC+Fundamentals.rar -- Adobe Premiere Pro CC Fundamentals
  2. http://www.mediafire.com/download/ys44ptebw6tk4o8/Animation+and+Video+Editing+in+Photoshop+CS6.rar-- Animation and Video Editing in Photoshop CS6
  3. http://www.mediafire.com/download/evuudd9t6dtc3ej/Color+Correction+and+Grading+in+Adobe+Premiere+Pro+and+SpeedGrade.rar -- Color Correction and Grading in Adobe Premiere Pro and SpeedGrade
  4. http://www.mediafire.com/download/0gu7x007mpaclwd/Action+Scene+Editing+Techniques+in+Adobe+Premiere+Pro.rar -- Action Scene Editing Techniques in Adobe Premiere Pro
  5. http://www.mediafire.com/download/u6dko8ug5ysbrw2/Adobe+Premiere+Pro+CS6.rar -- Adobe Premiere Pro CS6 Setup [This is the software, not a course]

# Others
  1. http://www.mediafire.com/download/6ny3ybv2ojzr6vt/Clean+Code.rar-- Clean Code
  2. http://www.mediafire.com/download/cc6ibqxbhdcivea/TDD+with+Brad+Wilson.rar-- Test Driven Development with Brad Wilson
  3. http://www.mediafire.com/download/cp8w28mcl1258o4/ScrumFundamentals.rar-- The fundamentals of Scrum methodology
  4. http://www.mediafire.com/download/0u690ecz1q8lj1k/1.+Building+a+successful+blog.rar -- Building a successful blog
  5. http://www.mediafire.com/download/653jtq5261zuapx/2.+Building+a+High+Traffic%2C+Profitable+Blog.rar -- Building a high traffic profitable blog
  6. http://www.mediafire.com/download/xvgjnq2ispauz3v/Fiddler.rar-- Fiddler

=== Other Resources ===
http://www.mediafire.com/download/0i9b46gjcqzr2jc/root-me-docs.rar -- Useful PDFs about a huge amount of topics regarding hacking, extracted from repository.root-me.org
http://www.mediafire.com/file/02om55j9itey5x6/Perl.rar -- Perl documents
http://www.mediafire.com/file/g83pv4ov2v139ha/RedHat.rar -- Red hat documents
http://www.mediafire.com/file/j6bgke83y4eyo2x/Reverse+Engineering.rar -- Reverse Engineering
http://www.mediafire.com/file/zfnt7r9gkmasrjd/Assembly.rar-- Assembly

https://cybersecuritybase.github.io/-- Free course series by University of Helsinki in collaboration with F-Secure
https://www.mediafire.com/foldey952n2935ocnf/Documents -- 160 books on security stuff
https://github.com/onlurking/awesome-infosec-- A curated list of awesome information security resources
http://github.com/juandecarrion/awesome-self-hosted -- A curated list of awesome self hosted alternatives to cloud services.
https://github.com/paragonie/awesome-appsec-- A curated list of resources for learning about application security. Contains books, websites, blog posts, and self-assessment quizzes.
https://jivoi.github.io/2015/06/19/oscp-prepare/ -- OSCP Prepare
https://jivoi.github.io/2015/07/03/offensive-security-bookmarks/ -- All you need to pass OSCP
https://github.com/kurobeats/pentest-bookmarks/-- A collection of handy bookmarks

** Ask Case for PDFs and other stuff on a specific topic. There are also the following courses available which have not been categorized yet:
Introduction to game development with Unity http://www.mediafire.com/file/i7cam1iydph3q6c/Introduction+to+Game+Development+with+Unity.rar
FMOD http://www.mediafire.com/file/bsix3j259btgr3j/FMOD.rar
Digital audio fundamentals http://www.mediafire.com/file/i23kxm6zgo2nkva/Digital+Audio+Fundamentals.rar
Alchemy synth http://www.mediafire.com/file/x301h7qxz7jxpyz/Alchemy+Synth+Fundamentals+in+Logic+Pro.rar


=== Practice what you learn ===
* https://pentesterlab.com/exercises
* root-me.org -> webclient and webserver challenges can be done on the go, Capture The Flag, etc.
* hackerrank.com -> Very good for learning programming, has on-the-go exercises
* codeacademy.com
* use fucking google
* hacksplaining.com
* vulnhub.com

Other free hacking/IT videos: www.cybrary.it
Interesting github: https://github.com/hackedteam/ -- Check out Hacking Team if you haven't!
submitted by imthagh0st to Hacking_Tutorials [link] [comments]

A Good Pentesting Tools List

Collection of pentesting tools by BrainfuckSec

Anti Forensics Tools
Exploitation Tools
Forensics Tools
Information Gathering
Keyloggers
Maintaining Access
Password Attacks
Reverse Engineering
Sniffing Spoofing
Social Engineering
Vulnerability Analysis
Web Applications
Web Shells
Wireless Attacks
submitted by _brainfuck to Pentesting [link] [comments]

new england patriot has been created

By Katharine Brush Night Club PROMPTLY at quarter of ten P.M. Mrs. Brady descended the steps of the Elevated. She purchased from the newsdealer in the cubbyhole be- neath them a next month's magazine and an tomorrow morning's paper and, with these tucked under one plump arm, she walked. She walked two blocks north on Sixth Avenue; turned and went west. But not far west. Westward half a block only, to the place where the gay green awning marked "Club Français" paints a stripe of shade across the glimmer- ing sidewalk. Under the awning Mrs. Brady halted briefly, to remark to the six-foot doorman that it looked like rain and to await his perform- ance of his professional duty. When the small green door yawned open, she sighed deeply and plodded in. The foyer was a blackness, an air- less velvet blackness like the inside of a jeweler's box. Four drum-shaped lamps of golden silk suspended from the ceiling gave it light (a very little) and formed the jewels: gold signets, those, or cuff links for a giant. At the far end of the foyer there were black stair, faintly dusty, rippling upward toward an amber radiance. Mrs. Brady approached and ponderously mounted the stairs, clinging with one fist to the mangy velvet rope that railed their edge. From the top, Miss Lena Levin observed the ascent. Miss Levin was the checkroom girl. She had dark-at- the roots blonde hair and slender hips upon which, in moments of leisure, she wore her hands, like buckles of ivory loosely attached. This was a moment of leisure. Miss Levin waited behind her counter. Row upon row of hooks, empty as yet, and seeming to beckon——wee curved fingers of iron——waited be- hind her. "Late," said Miss Levin, "again." "Go wan!" said Mrs. Brady. "It's only ten to ten. Whew! Them stairs!" She leaned heavily, sideways, against Miss Levin's counter, and, applying one palm to the region of her heart, appeared at once to listen and to count. "Feel!" she cried then in a pleased voice. Miss Levin obediently felt. "Them stairs," continued Mrs. Brady darkly, "with my bad heart, will be the death of me. Whew! Well, dearie? What's the news?" "You got a paper," Miss Levin languidly reminded her. "Yeah!" agreed Mrs. Brady with sudden vehemence. "I got a paper!" She slapped it upon the counter. "An' a lot of time I'll get to read my paper, won't I now? On a Saturday night!" She moaned. "Other nights is bad enough, dear knows——but Saturday nights! How I dread 'em! Every Saturday night I say to my daughter, I say, 'Geraldine, I can't,' I say, 'I can't go through it again, an' that's all there is to it,' I say. 'I'll quit!' I say. An' I will, too!" added Mrs. Brady firmly, if indefinitely. Miss Levin, in defense of Saturday nights, mumbled some vague some- thing about tips. "Tips!" Mrs. Brady hissed it. She almost spat it. Plainly money was nothing, nothing at all, to this lady. "I just wish," said Mrs. Brady, and glared at Miss Levin, "I just wish you had to spend one Saturday night, just one in that dressing room! Bein' pushed an' stepped on and near knocked down by that gang of hussies, an' them orderin' an' bossin' you round like you was black, an' usin' your things an' then sayin' they're sorry, they got no change, they'll be back. Yeah! They never come back!" "There's Mr. Costello," whispered Miss Levin through lips that, like a ventriloquist's, scarcely stirred. "An' as I was sayin'," Mrs. Brady said at once brightly, "I got to leave you. Ten to ten, time I was on the job." She smirked at Miss Levin, nodded, and right-about-faced. There, indeed, Mr. Costello was. Mr. Billy Costello, manager, proprietor, monarch of all he surveyed. From the doorway of the big room where the little tables herded in a ring around the waxen floor, he surveyed Mrs. Brady, and in such a way that Mrs. Brady, momentarily forgetting her bad heart, walked fast, scurried faster, almost ran. The door of her domain was set politely in an alcove, beyond silken curtains looped up at the sides. Mrs. Brady reached it breathless, shoul- dered it open, and groped for the electric switch. Lights sprang up, a bright white blaze, intolerable for an instant to the eyes, like the sun on snow. Blinking, Mrs. Brady shut the door. The room was a spotless, white- tiled place, half beauty shop, half dressing room. Along one wall stood washstands, sturdy triplets in a row, balloons afloat above them. Against the opposite wall there was a couch. A third wall backed an elongated glass-topped dressing-table; and over the dressing-table and over the wash- stands long rectangular sheets of mirror reflected lights, doors, glossy tiles, lights multiplied. . . . Mrs. Brady moved across this glit- ter like a think dark cloud in a hurry. At the dressing table she came to a halt, and upon it she laid her news- paper, her magazine, and her purse ——a black purse worn gray with much clutching. She divested herself of a rusty black coat and a hat of the mushroom persuasion, and hung both up in a corner cupboard which she opened by means of one of a quite preposterous bunch of keys. From a nook in the cupboard she took down a lace-edged handkerchief with long streamers. She untied the streamers and tied them again around her chunky black alpaca waist. The handkerchief became an apron's baby cousin. Mrs. Brady relocked the cupboard door, fumbled her key ring over, and unlocked a capacious drawer of the dressing table. She spread a fresh towel on the plate-glass top, in the geometrical center, and upon the towel she arranged with care a pro- cession of things fished from the drawer. Things for the hair. Things for the complexion. Tings for the eyes, the lashes, the brows, the lips, and the fingernails. Things in boxes and things in jars and things in tubes and tins. Also an ash tray, matches pins, a tiny sewing kit, a pair of scissors. Last of all, a hand-printed sign, a nudging sort of sign: NOTICE! THESE ARTICLES, PLACED HERE FOR YOUR CONVENIENCE, ARE THE PROPERTY OF THE MAID. And directly beneath the sign, prop- ping it up against the looking glass, a china saucer, in which Mrs. Brady now slyly laid decoy money: two quarters and two dimes, in four- leaf-clover formation. Another drawer of the dressing table yielded a bottle of Bromo- seltzer, a bottle of aromatic spirits of ammonia, a tin of sodium bicar- bonate, and a teaspoon. These were lined up on a shelf above the couch. Mrs. Brady was ready for anything. And (from the grim, thin pucker of her mouth) expecting it. Music came to her ears. Rather, the beat of music, muffled, rhythmic, remote. Umpa-um, umpa-um, umpa- um-umm——Mr. "Fiddle" Baer and his band, hard at work on the first fox- trot of the night. It was teasing, foot- tapping music; but the large solemn feet of Mrs. Brady were still. She sat on the couch and opened her newspaper; and for some moments she read uninterruptedly, with spe- cial attention to the murders, the divorces, the breaches of promise, the funnies. Then the door swung inward, ad- mitting a blast of Mt. Fiddle Baer's best, a whiff of perfume, and a girl. Mrs. Brady put her paper away. The girl was petite and darkly beautiful; wrapped in fur and mounted on tall jeweled heels. She entered humming the ragtime song the orchestra was playing, and while she stood near the dressing table, stripping off her gloves, she con- tinued to hum it softly to her self: Oh, I know my baby loves me, I can tell my baby loves me. Here the dark girl got the left glove off, and Mrs. Brady glimpsed a platinum wedding ring. 'Cause there ain't no maybe In my baby's Eyes. The right glove came off. The dark little girl sat down in one of the chairs that faced the dressing table. She doffed her wrap, casting it care- lessly over the chair back. It had a cloth-of--gold lining, and the name of a Paris house was embroidered in curlicues on the label. Mrs. Brady hovered solicitously near. The dark little girl, still humming looked over the articles. "placed here for your convenience," and picked up the scissors. Having cut off a very small hangnail with the air of one performing a perilous major oper- ation, she seized and used the mani- cure buffer, and after that the eye- brow pencil. Mrs. Brady's mind, hopefully calculating the tip, jumped and jumped again like a taxi meter. Oh, I know my baby loves me——— The dark little girl applied powder and lipstick belonging to herself. She examined the result searchingly in the mirror and sat back, satisfied. She cast some silver Klink! Klink! into Mrs. Brady's saucer, and half rose. Then remembering something, she settled down again. The ensuing thirty seconds were spent by her in pulling off her platinum wedding ring, tying it in a corner of a lace handkerchief, and tucking the handkerchief down the bodice of her tight white velvet gown. "There!" she said. She swooped up her wrap and trotted toward the door, jeweled heels merrily twinkling. 'Cause there ain't no maybe——— The door fell shut. Almost instantly it opened again, and another girl came in. A blonde, this. She was very pretty in a round-eyed, doll-like way; but Mrs. Brady, re- garding her, mentally grabbed the spirits of ammonia bottle. For she looked terribly ill. The round eyes were dull, the pretty silly little face was drawn. The thin hands, picking at the fastenings of a specious beaded bag, trembled and twitched. Mrs. Brady cleared her throat. "Can I do something for you, miss?" Evidently the blonde girl had be- lieved herself alone in the dressing room. She started violently and glanced up, panic in her eyes. Panic, and something else. Something very like murderous hate——but for an in- stant only, so that Mrs. Brady, whose perceptions were never quick, missed it altogether. "A glass of water?" suggested Mrs. Brady. "No," said the girl, "no." She had one hand in the beaded bag now. Mrs. Brady could see it moving, causing the bag to squirm like a live thing and the fringe to shiver. "Yes!" she cried abruptly. "A glass of water ——please——you get it for me." She dropped on to the couch. Mrs. Brady scurried to the water cooler in the corner, pressed the spigot with a determined thumb. Water trickled out thinly. Mrs. Brady pressed harder, and scowled, and thought, "Something's wrong with this thing. I mustn't forget, next time I see Mr. Costello———" When again she faced her patient, the patient was sitting erect. She was thrusting her clenched hand back into the beaded bag again. She took only a sip of the water, but it seemed to help her quite miraculously. Almost at once color came to her cheeks, life to her eyes. She grew young again——as young as she was. She smiled up at Mrs. Brady. "Well!" she exclaimed. "What do you know about that!" She shook her honey-colored head. "I can't imagine what came over me." "Are you better now?" inquired Mrs. Brady. Yes. Oh, yes, I'm better now. You see," said the blonde girl confiden- tially, "we were at the theater, my boy friend and I, and it was hot and stuffy——I guess that must have been the trouble." She paused, and the ghost of her recent distress crossed her face. God! I thought that last act never would end!" she said. While she attended to her hair and complexion, she chattered gaily to Mrs. Brady, chattering on with scarcely a stop for breath, and laughed much. She said, among other things, that she and her "boy friend" had not known one another very long, but that she was "ga-ga" about him. "He is about me, too," she con- fessed. "He thinks I'm grand." She fell silent then, and in the looking glass her eyes were shad- owed, haunted. But Mrs. Brady, from where she stood, could not see the looking glass; and half a minute later the blonde girl laughed and began again. When she went out she seemed to dance out on winged feet; and Mrs. Brady, sighing, thought it must be nice to be young . . . and happy like that. The next arrivals were two. A tall, extremely smart young woman in black chiffon entered first, and held the door open for her companion; and the instant the door was shut, she said, as though it had been on the tip of her tongue for hours, "Amy, what under the sun hap- pened?" Amy, who was brown-eyed, brown-bobbed-haired, and patently annoyed about something, crossed to the dressing table an flopped into a chair before she made a reply. "Nothing," she said wearily then. "That's nonsense!" snorted the other. "Tell me. Was it something she said? She's a tactless ass, of course. Always was." "No, not anything she said. It was———" Amy bit her lip. "All right! I'll tell you. Before we left your apartment I just happened to notice that Tom had disappeared. So I went to look for him——I wanted to ask him if he'd remembered to tell the maid where we were going—— Skippy's subject to croup, you know, and we always leave word. Well, so I went into the kitchen, thinking Tom might be there mixing cock- tails——and there he was——and there she was!" The full red mouth of the other young woman pursed itself slightly. Her arched brows lifted. "Well?" Her matter-of-factness appeared to infuriate Amy. "He was kissing her!" she flung out. "Well?" said the other again. She chuckled softly and patted Amy's shoulder, as if it were the shoulder of a child. "You're surely not going to let that spoil your whole evening? Any dear! Kissing may once have been serious and significant——but it isn't nowadays. Nowadays, it's like shaking hands. It means nothing." But Amy was not consoled. "I hate her!" she cried desperately. "Redheaded thing! Calling me 'darling' and 'honey,' and s-sending me handkerchiefs for C-Christmas—— and then sneaking off behind closed doors and k-kissing my h-h-hus- band———" At this point Amy broke down, but she recovered herself sufficiently to add with venom, "I'd like to slap her!" "Oh, oh, oh," smiled the tall young woman, "I wouldn't do that!" Amy wiped her eyes with what might well have been one of the Christmas handkerchiefs, and con- fronted her friend. "Well, what would you do, Vera? If you were I?" "I'd forget it," said Vera, "and have a good time. I'd kiss somebody myself. You've no idea how much better you'd feel!" I don't do———" Amy began in- dignantly; but as the door behind her opened a third young woman ——redheaded, ear-ringed, exquisite—— lilted in, she changed her tone. "Oh, hello!" she called sweetly, beaming at the newcomer via the mirror. "We were wondering what had become of you!" The redheaded girl, smiling easily back, dropped her cigarette on the floor and crushed it out wit a silver shod toe. "Tom and I were talking to Fiddle Baer," she explained. "He's going to play 'Clap Yo' Hands' next, because it's my favorite. Lend me a comb, will you?" "There's a comb there," said Vera, indicating Mrs. Brady's business comb. "But imagine using it!" murmured the redheaded girl. "Amy, darling, haven't you one?" Amy produced a tiny comb from her rhinestone purse. "Don't forget to bring it when you come," she said, and stood up. "I'm going on out, I want to tell Tom something." She went. The redheaded young woman and the tall black-chiffon one were alone, except for Mrs. Brady. The red- headed one beaded her incredible lashes. The tall one, the one called Vera, sat watching her." And Sylvia looked. Anybody, addressed in that tone, would have. "There is one thing," Vera went on quietly, holding the other's eyes "that I want understood. And that is, 'Hands off!' Do you hear me?" "I know what you mean." "You know what I mean!" The redheaded girl shrugged her shoulders. "Amy told you she saw us, I suppose." Precisely. And," went on Vera, gathering up her possessions and rising, "as I said before, you're to keep away." Her eyes blazed sudden white-hot rage. "Because, as you very well know, he belongs to me," she said, and departed, slamming the door. Between eleven o'clock and one Mrs. Brady was very busy indeed. Never for more than a moment during those two hours was the dressing room empty. Often it was jammed, full to overflowing with curled cropped heads, with ivory arms and shoulders, with silk and lace and chiffon, with legs. The door flapped in and back, in the back. The mirrors caught and held——and lost—— a hundred different faces. Powder veiled the dressing table with a thin white dust; cigarette stubs, scarlet at the tip, choked the ash receiver. Dimes and quarter clattered into Mrs. Brady's saucer——and were transferred to Mrs. Brady's purse. The original seventy cents remained. That much, and no more, would Mrs. Brady gamble on the integrity of womankind. She earned her money. She threaded needles and took stitches. She powdered the backs of necks. She supplied towels for soapy, drip- ping hands. She removed a speck from a teary blue eye and pounded the heel on a slipper. She curled the struggling ends of a black bob and a gray bob, pinned a velvet flower on a lithe round waist, mixed three doses of bicarbonate of soda, took charge of a shed pink-satin girdle, collected, on hands and knees, sev- eral dozen fake pearls that had wept from a broken string. She served chorus girls and school- girls, gay young matrons and gayer young mistresses, a lady who had divorced four husbands, and a lady who had poisoned one, the secret (more or less) sweetheart of a Most Distinguished Name, and the Brains of a bootleg gang. . . . She saw things. She saw a yellow check, with the ink hardly dry. She saw four tiny bruises, such as fingers might make, on an arm. She saw a girl strike another girl, not playfully. She saw a bundle of letter some man wished he had not written, safe and deep in a brocaded handbag. About midnight the door flew open and at once was pushed shut, and a gray-eyed, lovely child stood backed against it, her palms flattened on the panels at her sides, the dra- peries of her white chiffon gown settling lightly to rest around her. There were already five damsels of varying ages in the dressing room. The latest arrival marked their pres- ence with a flick of her eyes and, standing just where she was, she called peremptorily, "Maid!" Mrs. Brady, standing just where she was, said, "Yes, miss?" "Please come here," said the girl. Mrs. Brady, as slowly as she dared, did so. The girl lowered her voice to a tense half whisper. "Listen! Is there any way I can get out of here except through this door I came in?" Mrs. Brady stared at her stupidly. "Any window?" persisted the girl. "Or anything?" Here they were interrupted by the exodus of two of the damsels-of- varying-ages, Mrs. Brady opening the door for them——and in so doing caught a glimpse of the man who waited in the hall outside, a debonair, old-young man with a girl's furry wrap hung over his arm, and his hat in his hand. The door clicked. The gray-eyed girl moved out from the wall, against which she had flattened herself——for all the world like one eluding pursuit in a cinema. "What about the window?" she demanded, pointing. "That's all the farther it opens," said Mrs. Brady. "Oh! And it's the only one——isn't it?" "It is." "Damn," said the girl. "Then there's no way out?" "No way but the door," said Mrs. Brady testily. The girl looked at the door. She seemed to look through the door, and to despise and to fear what she saw. Then she looked at Mrs. Brady. "Well," she said, "then I s'pose the only thing for me to do is to stay in here." She stayed. Minutes ticked by. Jazz crooned distantly, stopped, struck up again. Other girls came and went. Still the gray-eyed girl sat on the couch, with her back to the wall and her shapely legs crossed smoking cigarettes, one from the stub of another. After a long while she said, "Maid!" "Yes, miss?" "Peek out that door, will you, and see if there's anyone standing there." Mrs. Brady peeked, and reported that there was. There was a gentle- man with a little bit of a black mustache standing there. The same gentleman, in fact, who was stand- ing there "just after you came in." "Oh, Lord," sighed the gray-eyed girl. "Well . . . I can't stay here all night, that's one sure thing." She slid off the couch, and went listlessly to the dressing table. There she occupied herself for a minute or two. Suddenly, without a word, she darted out. Thirty seconds later Mrs. Brady was elated to find two crumpled one- dollar bills lying in the saucer. Her joy, however, died a premature death. For she made an almost si- multaneous second discovery. A a sad- dening one. Above all, a puzzling one. "Now what for," marveled Mrs. Brady, "did she want to walk off with them scissors?" This at twelve-twenty-five. At twelve-thirty a quartet of ex- cited young things burst in, babbling madly. All of them had their evening wraps about them; all talked at once. One of them, a Dresden-china girl with a heart-shaped face, was the center of attraction. Around her the rest fluttered like monstrous butter- flies; to her they addressed their shrill exclamatory cries. "Babe," they called her. Mrs. Brady heard snatches: "Not in this state unless . . ." "Well, you can in Maryland, Jimmy says." "Oh, there must be some place nearer than . . ." "Isn't this marvelous?" "When did it happen, Babe? When did you decide?" "Just now," the girl with the heart- shaped face sang softly, "when we were dancing." The babble resumed, "But listen, Babe, what'll your mother and father . . . ?" "Oh, never mind, let's hurry." "Shall we be warm enough with just these thin wraps, do you think? Babe, will you be warm enough? Sure?" Powder flew and little pocket combs marched through bright mar- cels. Flushed cheeks were painted pinker still. "My pearls," said Babe, "are old. And my dress and my slippers are new. Now, let's see——what can I borrow?" A lace handkerchief, a diamond bar pin, a pair of earrings were proffered. She chose the bar pin, and its owner unpinned it proudly, gladly. "I've got blue garters!" exclaimed a shrill little girl in a silver dress. "Give me one, then," directed Babe. "I'll trade with you. . . . There! That fixes that." More babbling, "Hurry! Hurry up!" . . . "Listen are you sure we'll be warm enough? Because we can stop at my house, there's nobody home." "Give me that puff, Babe, I'll powder your back." "And just to think a week ago you;d never even met each other!" "Oh, hurry up, let's get started!" "I'm ready." "So'm I." "Ready, Babe? You look ador- able." "Come on, everybody." They were gone again, and then dressing room seemed twice as still and vacant as before. A minute of grace, during which Mrs. Brady wiped the spilled pow- der away with a damp gray rag. Then the door jumped open again. Two evening gowns appeared and made for the dressing table in a bee line. Slim tubular gowns they were, one green, one palest yellow. Yel- low hair went wit the green gown, brown hair with the yellow. The green-gowned, yellow-haired girl wore gardenias on her left shoulder, four of them, and a flashing bracelet on each fragile wrist. The other girl looked less prosperous; still, you would rather have looked at her. Both ignored Mrs. Brady's cos- metic display as utterly as they ignored Mrs. Brady, producing full field equipment of their own. "Well," said the girl with gar- denias, rouging energetically, "how do you like him?" "Oh-h——all right." "Meaning, 'Not any,' hmm? I sus- pected as much!" The girl with gardenians turned in her chair and scanned her companion's profile with disapproval. "See here, Marilee," she drawled, "are you going to be a damn fool all your life?" "He's fat," said Marilee dreamily. "Fat, and——greasy, sort of. I mean greasy in his mind. Don't you know what I mean?" "I know one thing," declared the other. "I know Who He Is! And if I were you, that's all I'd need to know. Under the circumstances." The last three words, stressed meaningly, affected the girl called Marilee curiously. She grew grave. Her lips and lashes drooped. For some seconds she sat frowning a little, breaking a black-sheathed lip- stick in two and fitting it together again. "She's worse," she said finally, low. "Worse?" Marilee nodded. "Well," said the girl with gar- denias, "there you are. It's the climate. She'll never be anything but worse, if she doesn't get away. Out West. Arizona or somewhere." "I know," murmured Marilee. The other girl opened a tin of eye shadow. "Of course," she said dryly, "suit yourself. She's not my sister." Marilee said nothing. Quiet she sat, breaking the lipstick, mending it, breaking it. "Oh, well," she breathed finally, wearily, and straightened up. She propped her elbows on the plate- glass dressing-table top and leaned toward the mirror, and with the lip- stick she began to make her coral- pink mouth very red and gay and reckless and alluring. Nightly at one o'clock Vane and Moreno dance for the Club Français. They dance a tango, they dance a waltz; then, by way of encore, they do a Black Bottom, and a trick of their own called the Wheel. They dance for twenty, thirty minutes. And while they dance you do not leave your table——for this is what you came to see. Vane and Moreno. The new New York thrill. The sole justifica- tion for the five-dollar couvert ex- torted by Billy Costello. From one until half-past, then, was Mrs. Brady's recess. She had been looking forward t it all the eve- ning long. When it began——when the opening chords of the tango music sounded stirringly from the room outside——Mrs. Brady brightened. With a right good will she sped the parting guests. Alone, she unlocked her cupboard and took out her magazine——the magazine she had bought three hours before. Heaving a great breath of relief and satisfaction, she plumped herself on the couch and fingered the pages. Immediately she was absorbed, her eyes drinking up the printed lines, her lips moving soundlessly. The magazine was Mrs. Brady's favorite. Its stories were true stories, taken from life (so the editor said); and to Mrs. Brady they were live, vivid threads in the dull, drab pat- tern of her night. 
From Harper's Bazaar of September, 1927. Copyright, 1927, by Katharine Brush. From A Treasury of Short Stories. Edited by Bernardine Kielty. Copyright, 1947, Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York; pp. 655—663.
یہ آپ کی جگہ ہے ایک دوسرے کے ساتھ حسن سلوک کرو۔ https://old.reddit.com/thesee [♘] [♰] [☮]
submitted by MarleyEngvall to newenglandpatriot [link] [comments]

An attempt at a fully comprehensive look at how to scale bitcoin. Lets bring Bitcoin out of Beta!

 
WARNING THIS IS GOING TO BE A REALLY REALLY LONG POST BUT PLEASE READ IT ALL. SCALING BITCOIN IS A COMPLEX ISSUE! HOPEFULLY HAVING ALL THE INFO IN ONE PLACE SHOULD BE USEFUL
 
Like many people in the community I've spent the past month or so looking deeply into the bitcoin scaling debate. I feel there has never been a fully comprehensive thread on how bitcoin could scale. The closest I have seen is gavinandresen's medium posts back in the summer describing the problem and a solution, and pre-emptively answering supposed problems with the solution. While these posts got to the core of the issue and spawned the debate we have been having, they were quite general and could have used more data in support. This is my research and proposal to scale bitcoin and bring the community back together.
 
 
The Problem
 
There seems to me to be five main fundamental forces at play in finding a balanced solution;
  • 'node distribution',
  • 'mining decentralisation',
  • 'network utility',
  • 'time',
  • 'adoption'.
 
 
Node Distribution
Bandwidth has a relationship to node count and therefore 'node distribution'. This is because if bandwidth becomes too high then fewer people will be able to run a node. To a lesser extent bandwidth also effects 'mining decentralisation' as miners/pool owners also need to be able to run a node. I would argue that the centralisation pressures in relation to bandwidth are negligible though in comparison to the centralisation pressure caused by the usefulness of larger pools in reducing variance. The cost of a faster internet connection is negligible in comparison to the turnover of the pools. It is important to note the distinction between bandwidth required to propagate blocks quickly and the bandwidth required to propagate transactions. The bandwidth required to simply propagate transactions is still low today.
New node time (i.e. the time it takes to start up a new node) also has a relationship with node distribution. i.e. If it takes too long to start a new node then fewer people will be willing to take the time and resources to start a new node.
Storage Space also has a relationship with node distribution. If the blockchain takes up too much space on a computer then less people will be willing to store the whole blockchain.
Any suitable solution should look to not decrease node distribution significantly.
 
Mining Decentralisation
Broadcast time (the time it takes to upload a block to a peer) has a relationship with mining centralisation pressures. This is because increasing broadcast time increases the propagation time, which increases the orphan rate. If the orphan rate it too high then individual miners will tend towards larger pools.
Validation time (the time it to validate a block) has a relationship with mining centralisation pressures. This is because increasing validation time increases the propagation time, which increases the orphan rate. If the orphan rate it too high then individual miners will tend towards larger pools.
Any suitable solution should look to not increase mining centralisation significantly.
 
Network Utility
Network Utility is one that I find is often overlooked, is not well understood but is equally as important. The network utility force acts as a kind of disclaimer to the other two forces. It has a balancing effect. Increasing the network utility will likely increase user adoption (The more useful something is, the more people will want to use it) and therefore decreasing network utility will likely decrease user adoption. User adoption has a relationship with node count. i.e. the more people, companies and organisations know about and use bitcoin, the more people, companies and organisations that will run nodes. For example we could reduce block size down to 10KB, which would reduce broadcast time and validation time significantly. This would also therefore reduce mining centralisation pressures significantly. What is very important to realise though is that network utility would also be significantly be reduced (fewer people able to use bitcoin) and therefore so would node distribution. Conversely, if we increased the block size (not the limit) right now to 10GB, the network utility would be very high as bitcoin would be able to process a large number of transactions but node distribution would be low and mining centralisation pressures would be high due to the larger resource requirements.
Any suitable solution should look to increase network utility as time increases.
 
Time
Time is an important force because of how technology improves over time. Technology improves over time in a semi-predicable fashion (often exponential). As we move through time, the cost of resources required to run the bitcoin network (if the resource requirements remained static) will decrease. This means that we are able to increase resource requirements proportional to technological improvements/cost reductions without any increase in costs to the network. Technological improvements are not perfectly predictable though so it could be advantageous to allow some buffer room for when technological improvements do not keep up with predictions. This buffer should not be applied at the expense of the balance between the other forces though (i.e. make the buffer too big and network utility will be significantly decreased).
 
 
Adoption
Increasing adoption means more people using the bitcoin/blockchain network. The more people use bitcoin the more utility it has, and the more utility Bitcoin has the more people will want to use it (network effect). The more people use bitcoin, the more people there that have an incentive to protect bitcoin.
Any suitable solution should look to increase adoption as time increases.
 
 
The Solution Proposed by some of the bitcoin developers - The Lightning Network
 
The Lightning Network (LN) is an attempt at scaling the number of transactions that can happen between parties by not publishing any transaction onto the blockchain unless it is absolutely necessary. This is achieved by having people pool bitcoin together in a "Channel" and then these people can transact instantly within that channel. If any shenanigans happen between any of the parties, the channel can be closed and the transactions will be settled on the blockchain. The second part of their plan is limit the block size to turn bitcoin into a settlement network. The original block size limit of 1MB was originally put in place by Satoshi as an anti-DOS measure. It was to make sure a bad actor could not propagate a very large block that would crash nodes and increase the size of the blockchain unnecessarily. Certain developers now want to use this 1MB limit in a different way to make sure that resource requirements will stay low, block space always remains full, fees increase significantly and people use the lightning network as their main way of transacting rather than the blockchain. They also say that keeping the resource requirements very low will make sure that bitcoin remains decentralised.
 
Problems with The Lightning Network
The LN works relatively well (in theory) when the cost and time to publish a set of transactions to the network are kept low. Unfortunately, when the cost and time to publish a set of transactions on the blockchain become high, the LN's utility is diminished. The trust you get from a transaction on the LN comes only from the trustless nature of having transactions published to the bitcoin network. What this means is that if a transaction cannot be published on the bitcoin network then the LN transaction is not secured at all. As transactions fees rise on the bitcoin blockchain the LN utility is diminished. Lets take an example:
  • Cost of publishing a transaction to the bitcoin network = $20
  • LN transaction between Bob and Alice = $20.
  • Transaction between Bob and Alice has problem therefore we want to publish it to the blockchain.
  • Amount of funds left after transaction is published to the blockchain = $20 - $20 = $0.
This is also not a binary situation. If for example in this scenario, the cost to publish the transaction to blockchain was $10 then still only 50% of the transaction would be secure. It is unlikely anyone really call this a secure transaction.
Will a user make a non-secured/poorly secured transaction on the LN when they could make the same transaction via an altcoin or non-cryptocurrency transaction and have it well secured? It's unlikely. What is much more likely to happen is that transaction that are not secured by bitcoin because of the cost to publish to the blockchain will simply overflow into altcoins or will simply not happen on any cryptocurrency network. The reality is though, that we don't know exactly what will happen because there is no precedent for it.
Another problem outside of security is convenience. With a highly oversaturated block space (very large backlog of transactions) it could take months to have a transaction published to the blockchain. During this time your funds will simply be stuck. If you want to buy a coffee with a shop you don't have a channel open with, instead of simply paying with bitcoin directly, you would have to wait months to open a channel by publishing a transaction to the bitcoin blockchain. I think your coffee might be a little cold by then (and mouldy).
I suggest reading this excellent post HERE for other rather significant problems with the LN when people are forced to use it.
The LN is currently not complete and due to its high complexity it will take some time to have industry wide implementation. If it is implemented on top of a bitcoin-as-a-settlement-network economy it will likely have very little utility.
 
Uses of The LN
The LN is actually an extremely useful layer-2 technology when it is used with it's strengths. When the bitcoin blockchain is fast and cheap to transact on, the LN is also extremely useful. One of the major uses for the LN is for trust-based transactions. If you are transacting often between a set of parties you can truly trust then using LN makes absolute sense since the trustless model of bitcoin is not necessary. Then once you require your funds to be unlocked again it will only take a short time and small cost to open them up to the full bitcoin network again. Another excellent use of LN would be for layer-3 apps. For example a casino app: Anyone can by into the casino channel and play using real bitcoins instantly in the knowledge that is anything nefarious happens you can instantly settle and unlock your funds. Another example would be a computer game where you can use real bitcoin in game, the only difference is that you connect to the game's LN channel and can transact instantly and cheaply. Then whenever you want to unlock your funds you can settle on the blockchain and use your bitcoins normally again.
LN is hugely more powerful, the more powerful bitcoin is. The people making the LN need to stick with its strengths rather than sell it as an all-in-one solution to bitcoin's scaling problem. It is just one piece of the puzzle.
 
 
Improving Network Efficiency
 
The more efficient the network, the more we can do with what we already have. There are a number of possible efficiency improvements to the network and each of them has a slightly different effect.
 
Pruning
Pruning allows the stored blockchain size to be reduced significantly by not storing old data. This has the effect of lowering the resource requirements of running a node. a 40GB unpruned blockchain would be reduced in size to 550MB. (It is important to note that a pruned node has lower utility to the network)
 
Thin Blocks
Thin blocks uses the fact that most of the nodes in the network already have a list of almost all the same transactions ready to be put into the blockchain before a block is found. If all nodes use the same/similar policy for which transactions to include in a block then you only need to broadcast a small amount of information across the network for all nodes to know which transactions have been included (as opposed to broadcasting a list of all transactions included in the block). Thin Blocks have the advantage of reducing propagation which lowers the mining centralisation pressure due to orphaned blocks.
 
libsecp256k1 libsecp256k1 allows a more efficient way of validating transactions. This means that propagation time is reduced which lowers the mining centralisation pressure due to orphaned blocks. It also means reduced time to bootstrap the blockchain for a new node.
 
Serialised Broadcast
Currently block transmission to peers happens in parallel to all connected peers. Obviously for block propagation this is a poor choice in comparison to serial transmission to each peer one by one. Using parallel transmission means that the more peers you have, the slower the propagation, whereas serial transmission does not suffer this problem. The problem that serial transmission does suffer from though is variance. If the order that you send blocks to peers in is random, then it means sometimes you will send blocks to a peer who has a slow/fast connection and/or is able to validate slowly/quickly. This would mean the average propagation time would increase with serialised transmission but depending on your luck you would sometimes have faster propagation and sometimes have slower propagation. As this will lower propagation time it will also lower the mining centralisation pressure due to orphaned blocks. (This is just a concept at the moment but I don't see why it couldn't be implemented).
 
Serialised Broadcast Sorting
This is a fix for the variance that would occur due to serialised broadcast. This sorts the order that you broadcast a block to each peer into; fastest upload + validation speed first and slowest upload speed and validation speed last. This not only decreases the variance to zero but also allows blocks to propagation to happen much faster. This also has the effect of lowering the mining centralisation pressure due to orphaned blocks. (This is just a concept at the moment but I don't see why it couldn't be implemented).
 
Here is a table below that shows roughly what the effects these solutions should have.
Name Bandwidth Broadcast Time Validation Time New Node Time Storage Space
Pruning 1 1 1 1 0.014
Thin Blocks 0.42 0.1 0.1 1 1
libsecp256k1 1 1 0.2 0.6 1
Serialised Broadcast 1 0.5 1 1 1
KYN 1 0.75 1 1 1
Segregated Witness 1 1 1 0.4 1
TOTAL 0.42 0.0375 0.02 0.24 0.014
Multiplier 2.38 26.7 50 - 70
(The "multiplier" shows how many times higher the block size could be relative to the specific function.)
 
 
The Factors in Finding a Balanced Solution
 
At the beginning of this post I detailed a relatively simple framework for finding a solution by describing what the problem is. There seems to me to be five main fundamental forces at play in finding a balanced solution; 'node distribution', 'mining decentralisation', 'network utility', 'time' and 'adoption'. The optimal solution needs to find a balance between all of these forces taking into account a buffer to offset our inability to predict the future with absolute accuracy.
To find a suitable buffer we need to assign a set of red line values which certain values should not pass if we want to make sure bitcoin continues to function as well as today (at a minimum). For example, percentage of orphans should stay below a certain value. These values can only be a best estimate due to the complexity of bitcoin economics, although I have tried to provide as sound reasoning as possible.
 
Propagation time
It seems a fair limit for this would be roughly what we have now. Bitcoin is still functioning now. Could mining be more decentralised? Yes, of course, but it seems bitcoin is working fine right now and therefore our currently propagation time for blocks is a fairly conservative limit to set. Currently 1MB blocks take around 15 seconds to propagate more than 50% of the network. 15 second propagation time is what I will be using as a limit in the solution to create a buffer.
 
Orphan Rate
This is obviously a value that is a function of propagation time so the same reasoning should be used. I will use a 3% limit on orphan rate in the solution to create a buffer.
 
Non-Pruned Node Storage Cost
For this I am choosing a limit of $200 in the near-term and $600 in the long-term. I have chosen these values based on what I think is a reasonable (maximum) for a business or enthusiast to pay to run a full node. As the number of transactions increases as more people use bitcoin the number of people willing to pay a higher price to run a node will also increase although the percentage of people will decrease. These are of course best guess values as there is no way of knowing exactly what percentage of users are willing to pay what.
 
Pruned Node Storage Cost
For this I am choosing a limit of $3 in the near-term (next 5 years) and $9 in the long-term (Next 25 years). I have chosen these values based on what I think is a reasonable (maximum) for normal bitcoin user to pay. In fact this cost will more likely be zero as almost all users have an amount of storage free on their computers.
 
Percentage of Downstream Bandwidth Used
This is a best guess at what I think people who run nodes would be willing to use to be connected to the bitcoin network directly. I believe using 10% (maximum) of a users downstream bandwidth is the limit of what is reasonable for a full node (pruned and non-pruned). Most users would continue to access the blockchain via SPV wallets though. Downstream is generally a much more valuable resource to a user than upstream due to the nature of the internet usage.
 
Percentage of Upstream Bandwidth Used
This is a best guess at what I think people who run nodes would be willing to use to be connected to the bitcoin network directly. I believe using 25% (maximum) of a users downstream bandwidth is the limit of what is reasonable for a full node (pruned and non-pruned). Most users would continue to access the blockchain via SPV wallets though. Upstream is generally a much less valuable resource to a user than downstream due to the nature of the internet usage.
 
Time to Bootstrap a New Node
My limit for this value is at 5 days using 50% of downstream bandwidth in the near-term and 30 days in the long-term. This seems like a reasonable number to me for someone who wants to start running a full node. Currently opening a new bank account takes at least week until everything is set up and you have received your cards, so it seems to me people would be willing to wait this long to become connected. Again, this is a best guess on what people would be willing to do to access the blockchain in the future. Most users requiring less security will be able to use an SPV wallet.
It is important to note that we only need enough nodes to make sure the blockchain is distributed across many places with many backups of the full blockchain. It is likely that a few thousand is a minimum for this. Increasing this amount to hundreds of thousands or millions of full nodes is not necessarily that much of an advantage to node distribution but could be a significant disadvantage to mining centralisation. This is because the more nodes you have in the network, the longer it takes to propagate >50% of it.
 
Storage Cost Price Reduction Over Time
Storage cost follows a linear logarithmic trend. Costs of HDD reducing by 10 times every 5 years, although this has slowed over the past few years. This can be attributed to the flooding in South East Asia and the transition to SSD technology. SSD technology also follows the linear logarithmic trend of costs reducing 10 times every 5 years, or roughly decreasing 37% per year.
 
Average Upload and Download Bandwidth Increases Over Time
Average upload and download bandwidth increases in a linear logarithmic trend. Both upload and download bandwidth follow the same trend of doubling roughly every two years, or increasing 40% per year.
 
Price
I was hesitant to include this one here but I feel it is unavoidable. Contrary to what people say (often when the price is trending downwards) bitcoin price is an extremely important metric in the long-term. Depending on bitcoin's price, bitcoin's is useful to; enthusiasts->some users->small companies->large companies->nations->the world, in roughly that order. The higher bitcoin's price is the more liquid the market will be and the more difficult it will be to move the price, therefore increasing bitcoin's utility. Bitcoin's price in the long-term is linked to adoption, which seems to happen in waves, as can be seen in the price bubbles over the years. If we are planning/aiming for bitcoin to at least become a currency with equal value to one of the worlds major currencies then we need to plan for a market cap and price that reflect that. I personally think there are two useful targets we should use to reflect our aims. The first, lower target is for bitcoin to have a market cap the size of a major national currency. This would put the market cap at around 2.1 trillion dollars or $100,000 per bitcoin. The second higher target is for bitcoin to become the world's major reserve currency. This would give bitcoin a market cap of around 21 trillion dollars and a value of $1,000,000 per bitcoin. A final, and much more difficult target is likely to be bitcoin as the only currency across the world, but I am not sure exactly how this could work so for now I don't think this is worth considering.
 
As price increases, so does the subsidy reward given out to miners who find blocks. This reward is semi-dynamic in that it remains static (in btc terms) until 210,000 blocks are found and then the subsidy is then cut in half. This continues to happen until all 21,000,000 bitcoins have been mined. If the value of each bitcoin increases faster than the btc denominated subsidy decreases then the USD denominated reward will be averagely increasing. Historically the bitcoin price has increased significantly faster than subsidy decreases. The btc denominated subsidy halves roughly every 4 years but the price of bitcoin has historically increased roughly 50 fold in the same time.
 
Bitcoin adoption should happen in a roughly s-curve dynamic like every other technology adoption. This means exponential adoption until the market saturation starts and adoption slows, then the finally is the market becomes fully saturated and adoption slowly stops (i.e. bitcoin is fully adopted). If we assume the top of this adoption s-curve has one of the market caps above (i.e. bitcoin is successful) then we can use this assumption to see how we can transition from a subsidy paid network to a transaction fee paid network.
 
Adoption
Adoption is the most difficult metric to determine. In fact it is impossible to determine accurately now, let alone in the future. It is also the one of the most important factors. There is no point in building software that no one is going to use after all. Equally, there is no point in achieving a large amount of adoption if bitcoin offers none of the original value propositions. Clearly there is a balance to be had. Some amount of bitcoin's original value proposition is worth losing in favour of adoption, and some amount of adoption is worth losing to keep bitcoin's original value proposition. A suitable solution should find a good balance between the two. It is clear though that any solution must have increased adoption as a basic requirement, otherwise it is not a solution at all.
 
One major factor related to adoption that I rarely see mentioned, is stability and predictability. This is relevant to both end users and businesses. End users rely on stability and predictability so that they do not have to constantly check if something has changed. When a person goes to get money from a cash machine or spend money in a shop, their experience is almost identical every single time. It is highly dependable. They don't need to keep up-to-date on how cash machines or shops work to make sure they are not defrauded. They know exactly what is going to happen without having to expend any effort. The more deviation from the standard experience a user experiences and the more often a user experiences a deviation, the less likely a user is going to want to continue to use that service. Users require predictability extending into the past. Businesses who's bottom line is often dependent on reliable services also require stability and predictability. Businesses require predictability that extends into the future so that they can plan. A business is less likely to use a service for which they do not know they can depend on in the future (or they know they cannot depend on).
For bitcoin to achieve mass adoption it needs a long-term predictable and stable plan for people to rely on.
 
 
The Proposal
 
This proposal is one based on determining a best fit balance of every factor and a large enough buffer to allows for our inability to perfectly predict the future. No one can predict the future with absolutely certainty but it does not mean we cannot make educated guesses and plan for it.
 
The first part of the proposal is to spend 2016 implementing all available efficiency improvements (i.e the ones detailed above) and making sure the move to a scaled bitcoin happens as smoothly as possible. It seems we should set a target of implementing all of the above improvements within the first 6 months of 2016. These improvements should be implemented in the first hardfork of its kind, with full community wide consensus. A hardfork with this much consensus is the perfect time to test and learn from the hardforking mechanism. Thanks to Seg Wit, this would give us an effective 2 fold capacity increase and set us on our path to scalability.
 
The second part of the proposal is to target the release of a second hardfork to happen at the end of 2016. Inline with all the above factors this would start with a real block size limit increase to 2MB (effectively increasing the throughput to 4x compared to today thanks to Seg Wit) and a doubling of the block size limit every two years thereafter (with linear scaling in between). The scaling would end with an 8GB block size limit in the year 2039.
 
 
How does the Proposal fit inside the Limits
 
 
Propagation time
If trends for average upload and bandwidth continue then propagation time for a block to reach >50% of the nodes in the network should never go above 1s. This is significantly quickly than propagation times we currently see.
In a worst case scenario we can we wrong in the negative direction (i.e. bandwidth does not increase as quickly as predicted) by 15% absolute and 37.5% relative (i.e. bandwidth improves at a rate of 25% per year rather than the predicted 40%) and we would still only ever see propagation times similar to today and it would take 20 years before this would happen.
 
Orphan Rate
Using our best guess predictions the orphan rate would never go over 0.2%.
In a worst case scenario where we are wrong in our bandwidth prediction in the negative direction by 37.5% relative, orphan rate would never go above 2.3% and it would take over 20 years to happen.
 
Non-Pruned Node Storage Cost
Using our best guess predictions the cost of storage for a non-pruned full node would never exceed $40 with blocks consistently 50% full and would in fact decrease significantly after reaching the peak cost. If blocks were consistently 100% full (which is highly unlikely) then the maximum cost of an un-pruned full node would never exceed $90.
In a worst case scenario where we are wrong in our bandwidth prediction in the negative direction by 37.5% relative and we are wrong in our storage cost prediction by 20% relative (storage cost decreases in cost by 25% per year instead of the predicted 37% per year), we would see a max cost to run a node with 50% full blocks of $100 by 2022 and $300 by 2039. If blocks are always 100% full then this max cost rises to $230 by 2022 and $650 in 2039. It is important to note that for storage costs to be as high as this, bitcoin will have to be enormously successful, meaning many many more people will be incentivised to run a full node (businesses etc.)
 
Pruned Node Storage Cost
Using our best guess predictions the cost of storage for a pruned full node would never exceed $0.60 with blocks consistently 50% full. If blocks were consistently 100% full (which is highly unlikely) then the max cost of an un-pruned full node would never exceed $1.30.
In a worst case scenario where we are wrong in our bandwidth prediction in the negative direction by 37.5% relative and we are wrong in our storage cost prediction by 20% relative (storage cost decreases in cost by 25% per year instead of the predicted 37% per year), we would see a max cost to run a node with 50% full blocks of $1.40 by 2022 and $5 by 2039. If blocks are always 100% full then this max cost rises to $3.20 by 2022 and $10 in 2039. It is important to note that at this amount of storage the cost would be effectively zero since users almost always have a large amount of free storage space on computers they already own.
 
Percentage of Downstream Bandwidth Used
Using our best guess predictions running a full node will never use more than 0.3% of a users download bandwidth (on average).
In a worst case scenario we can we wrong in the negative direction by 37.5% relative in our bandwidth predictions and we would still only ever see a max download bandwidth use of 4% (average).
 
Percentage of Upstream Bandwidth Used
Using our best guess predictions running a full node will never use more than 1.6% of a users download bandwidth (on average).
In a worst case scenario we can we wrong in the negative direction by 37.5% relative in our bandwidth predictions and we would only ever see a max download bandwidth use of 24% (average) and this would take over 20 years to occur.
 
Time to Bootstrap a New Node
Using our best guess predictions bootstrapping a new node onto the network should never take more than just over a day using 50% bandwidth.
In a worst case scenario we can we wrong in the negative direction by 37.5% relative in our bandwidth predictions and it would take one and 1/4 days to bootstrap the blockchain using 50% of the download bandwidth. By 2039 it would take 16 days to bootstrap the entire blockchain when using 50% bandwidth. I think it is important to note that by this point it is very possible the bootstrapping the blockchain could very well be done by simply buying an SSD with blockchain already bootstrapped. 16 days would be a lot of time to download software but it does not necessarily mean a decrease in centralisation. As you will see in the next section, if bitcoin has reached this level of adoption, there may well be many parties will to spend 16 days downloading the blockchain.
 
What if Things Turn Out Worse than the Worse Case?
While it is likely that future trends in the technology required to scale bitcoin will continue relatively similar to the past, it is possible that the predictions are completely and utterly wrong. This plan takes this into account though by making sure the buffer is large enough to give us time to adjust our course. Even if no technological/cost improvements (near zero likelihood) are made to bandwidth and storage in the future this proposal still gives us years to adjust course.
 
 
What Does This Mean for Bitcoin?
 
Significantly Increased Adoption
For comparison, Paypal handles around 285 transactions per second (tps), VISA handles around 2000tps and the total global non-cash transactions are around 12,400tps.
Currently bitcoin is capable of handling a maximum of around 3.5 transactions every second which are published to the blockchain roughly every 10 minutes. With Seg Wit implemented via a hardfork, bitcoin will be capable or around 7tps. With this proposal bitcoin will be capable of handling more transactions than Paypal (assuming Paypal experiences growth of around 7% per year) in the year 2027. Bitcoin will overtake VISA's transaction capability by the year 2035 and at the end of the growth cycle in 2039 it will be able to handle close to 50% of the total global non-cash transactions.
When you add on top second layer protocols( like the LN), sidechains, altcoins and off-chain transactions, there should be more than enough capacity for the whole world and every possible conceivable use for digital value transfer.
 
Transitioning from a Subsidy to a Transaction Fee Model
Currently mining is mostly incentivised by the subsidy that is given by the network (currently 25btc per block). If bitcoin is to widely successful it is likely that price increases will continue to outweigh btc denominated subsidy decreases for some time. This means that currently it is likely to be impossible to try to force the network into matching a significant portion of the subsidy with fees. The amount of fees being paid to miners has averagely increased over time and look like they will continue to do so. It is likely that the optimal time for fees to start seriously replacing the subsidy is when bitcoin adoption starts to slow. Unless you take a pessimistic view of bitcoin (thinking bitcoin is as big as it ever will be), it is reasonable to assume this will not happen for some time.
With this proposal, using an average fee of just $0.05, total transaction fees per day would be:
  • Year 2020 = $90,720
  • Year 2025 = $483,840.00
  • Year 2030 = $2,903,040.00
  • Year 2035 = $15,482,880.00
  • Year 2041 = $123,863,040.00 (full 8GB Blocks)
Miners currently earn a total of around $2 million dollars per day in revenue, significantly less than the $124 million dollars in transaction fee revenue possible using this proposal. That also doesn't include the subsidy which would still play some role until the year 2140. This transaction fee revenue would be a yearly revenue of $45 billion for miners when transaction fees are only $0.05 on average.
 
 
Proposal Data
You can use these two spreadsheets (1 - 2 ) to see the various metrics at play over time. The first spreadsheet shows the data using the predicted trends and the second spreadsheet shows the data with the worst case trends.
 
 
Summary
 
It's very clear we are on the edge/midst of a community (and possibly a network) split. This is a very dangerous situation for bitcoin. A huge divide has appeared in the community and opinions are becoming more and more entrenched on both sides. If we cannot come together and find a way forward it will be bad for everyone except bitcoin's competition and enemies. While this proposal is born from an attempt at finding a balance based on as many relevant factors as possible, it also fortunately happens to fall in between the two sides of the debate. Hopefully the community can see this proposal as a way of making a compromise, releasing the entrenchment and finding a way forward to scale bitcoin. I have no doubt that if we can do this, bitcoin will have enormous success in the years to come.
 
Lets bring bitcoin out of beta together!!
submitted by ampromoco to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

ELONCITY TECHNOLOGY BUILDING BLOCKS INTEGRATION

ECTP OPERATION
The ECTP specifies the algorithms and rules for an Eloncity microgrid operation. To implement this protocol,
we will need software and hardware to conform to ECTP specifications. An ECTP-compliant microgrid operation
consists of the following elements:
• Core ECTP core energy exchange platform based on high-performance blockchain network. The
Eloncity blockchain will be an enhanced Ethereum blockchain technology that has been optimized
for the high-volume high-speed energy transaction.
• Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) is a high-performance consensus mechanism for processing energy
transaction. The public validators selected by the community will ensure the security and integrity of
transactions, including execution of smart energy contracts. Eloncity’s blockchain will support over
10,000 transactions per second or 1.8 million concurrent energy exchanges at the three-minutes
interval.
• A versatile and optimized smart contract platform to support energy-exchange contracts amongst
community members, compute real-time equilibrium energy prices for a given location on an Eloncity
microgrid and conduct agreed energy exchange.
• A “mining” mechanism to award ECT tokens to customers who use ECTP-compliant BESS for storing
newly harvested renewable energy. The mining functions are written as long-running smart business
contracts compatible with the CyberMiles virtual machine.
• Universal Open Chain Access Protocol layer to support applications based on any blockchain
platforms such as Bitcoin or Ethereum. This universal application interface layer will facilitate eco-
rich applications for Eloncity.
The smart contracts based on energy exchange price equilibrium will be developed per ECTP specification and
be built into the hardware components of Eloncity microgrid to enable automated energy exchange. The first
hardware devices to support the ECTP is the POMCube NetZero, it is a behind-the-meter (BTM) BESS. NetZero
provides a buffer for storing excess renewable electricity produced on the customer premise. NetZero can make
autonomous energy exchange decisions based on its built-in AI algorithm to analyze the customer energy
demand profile. The demand parameters are machine-learned by “observing” the owner’s home energy use
over time, similar to how the Nest thermostat functions. With the ECTP enabled devices, such as the POMCube
NetZero, deployed in sufficient number on customer premises in an Eloncity microgrid, the Eloncity microgrid
will be able to achieve an optimal community energy supply-demand based on local renewable resources.
In addition to the described blockchain-based cryptoeconomics protocol and BESS, the Eloncity Model also
aims to provide an alternative power grid network so that the community members can exchange energy
independently from the utility’s T&D networks. In an Eloncity microgrid, the DCbus performs as a switching
device for managing local power flows and energy exchange. The Eloncity Model aims to maximize the utilization
of the DCbus with a pair of copper wires connecting each customer premise within an Eloncity microgrid to the
DCbus endpoints. Each endpoint follows the timing set by the Scheduler when sending/receiving energy to/from
the DCbus and hence the pair of copper wires is no longer the best effort network. The BESS associated with
each endpoint serves as ingress and egress buffer of the network, which, along with the Scheduler, prevents
endpoints from overflowing or under flowing the network. An important additional benefit of the DCbus is that
it saves as much as 17 percent of renewable energy as it avoids back-and-forth AC and DC conversions that are
prevalent in the current centralized AC grids. The DCbus is designed to run at 1,500V to take advantage of the standard technologies widely used in existing solar farms. The DCbus operating voltage can be reduced down
to 1,200V so that the maximum-peak-point-tracking (MPPT) of local solar PV charging controller can be run
stable without constantly changing its power-tracking algorithm to maintain the target 1,500V. Running the
DCbus at 1,200V will lose little conversion efficiency.
The Foundation envisions the strategic partnership with incumbent utilities to operate their own ECTP-
compliant endpoints and participate in the energy exchange with Eloncity microgrids. However, the Foundation
sees ideal Eloncity Model implementation to be new ZNE community constructions14. The new construction
would integrate rooftop PV, BESS, and DC system during the construction phase, which eliminates 3rd party
retrofit installer, higher financial cost and redundant roof insurance typically required in building retrofits.
The more streamlined PV, BESS and DC system installation process in new ZNE community construction will
offer significantly more cost-competitive energy from decentralized community-based renewable energy. In
summary, the Eloncity Model can be easily deployed in areas that lack the electricity grid infrastructure. In the
existing built environment that already have centralized AC grids, the Foundation will collaborate closely with
the local utility and local government, regional ISO and appropriate regional energy regulating agencies. The
Eloncity Model holds tremendous potentials to assist the utilities to fortify the existing power grids across the
globe.
submitted by Yohan- to Eloncity [link] [comments]

BWallet review by TREZOR developer

Hi Redditors,
maybe you noticed Chinese copy of TREZOR wallet, BWallet. Most likely I should feel flattered, because when others copy you, you're doing it right. However, I still feel that I have something to say to Reddit community about this product.
First of all, I'm quite surprised that BWallet is actually more expensive than TREZOR. Our existing customers can confirm that TREZOR device costs $19, the rest to $119 is cost of research and development, software updates, customer support, development of many surrounding opensource standards etc. It's a shame that BWallet is exact copy, yet it is more expensive, although they didn't spend a dollar to any of above. To anybody who doubt about TREZOR pricing, we'll happily sell them TREZOR units for $19 + shipping, with locked flash memory to prevent uploading of our firmware, which is not included in price of hardware.
I read many comments of people in style "cool, BWallet sell cheap hardware, so I'll upload TREZOR firmware into it and I'll be as safe as with TREZOR, but for cheap".
No. It won't work like this, for more reasons:
They changed keys in bootloader, so using another firmware than BWallet's will display "Unofficial firmware" warning during the bootup. That's pretty OK, you still can upload TREZOR's firmware there, but since then, you will never know if somebody replaced this "official" TREZOR firware by something else, because both SatoshiLabs' and attacker's firmware trigger the same warning on bootup. This affects practical security; Official TREZOR is so secure because everything put together makes sense, and you cannot remove one of security precautions (signed, peer-reviewed firmware in this case) and pretend that it didn't affect overall security.
Also, for some reason they used different wiring for buttons. That means you can load TREZOR firmware to device, BUT it won't work. You simply won't be able to click "Confirm" or "Cancel". Pretty useless, right? So you're sticked to their firwmare.
This leads to another issue with BWallet: We in SatoshiLabs put a lot of engineering effort at design level to ensure your privacy. That means, every TREZOR device looks like each other, and we cannot track your identities (from eshop) with your TREZOR accounts, your transaction history and your balance. Interesting part on BWallet is, that they really did not change much in firmware source codes, except adding tracking supercookie to the API. This particular line should catch your attention: https://github.com/BWallet/bwallet-mcu/blob/2427d396c29722e1ddd70791aaeb12b55ae5d609/firmware/fsm.c#L148. This reports processor's serial number to the computer and it means that they track who you are (they know to which name/address they shipped the device) and how much money do you have (because BWallet reports this ID to mybwallet.com).
Originally I though that the button issue mentioned above is just an engineering mistake. Now I tend to the conclusion that it's a purpose, because with different button wiring, you cannot replace their firmware easily, so they can track you. Few years ago, scammers were selling emails for good money. It seems that society is making progress and soon black markets will have lists of wealthy bitcoiners including their real names and residential addresses for few bucks.
If issues mentioned above didn't scare you to death yet, there's still something. They actually don't understand the firmware except they're able to compile it. The proof is that they have fatal error breaking the bootloader, and they didn't noticed it yet. Also their firmware is already one release behind our stable release, and we're a day from releasing yet another version with important changes. This kind of copy&paste development is unacceptable for software where your money are in the game. Or do you get a surgery from a doctor who learn over Youtube videos?
In conclusion I'd like to say that it's perfectly ok for anyone to take our open-source product and make his own one, but at the same time we're working hard on this project, we've established a trusted hardware wallet solution for everyone and we don't want to get this reputation ruined by a potentially hazardous adaptation from someone who approaches it with a copy&paste attitude. There's just more to TREZOR as a service than what is in the source codes.
Edit: They also purposedly disabled stack protector (https://github.com/BWallet/bwallet-mcu/blob/mastefirmware/bwallet.c#L41), which is common security measure which prevents not-yet-discovered buffer overflows.
submitted by slush0 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

The mempool clearing and the price returning to a level of stability are observations of a perfectly functioning settlement system

The price will gradually increase as more liquidity surrounds the network and higher value players are ability to participate. This happens as bitcoin proves it can handle over-capacity events. Alt-coins help provide a buffer for overflow.
https://medium.com/@rextar4444/my-previous-previous-explained-how-bitcoins-usefulness-as-a-settlement-system-is-able-to-scale-23bfdc02689f
https://medium.com/@rextar4444/bitcoins-most-valuable-usecase-7f5c6e95be22
Ver, Wright, Jihan, don't understand simple economics.
submitted by pokertravis to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Bitcoin 2010 vulnerability

Hello I am entering in this world and always curios and curious to analize vulnerabilities. Here there is the 2010 bitcoin vulnerability which I didn't full understand, can someone help me to understand?
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=822.0
The "value out" in this block #74638 is quite strange:
{"hash" : "0000000000790ab3f22ec756ad43b6ab569abf0bddeb97c67a6f7b1470a7ec1c","ver" : 1,"prev_block" : "0000000000606865e679308edf079991764d88e8122ca9250aef5386962b6e84","mrkl_root" : "618eba14419e13c8d08d38c346da7cd1c7c66fd8831421056ae56d8d80b6ec5e","time" : 1281891957,"bits" : 469794830,"nonce" : 28192719,"n_tx" : 2,"tx" : [{"hash" : "012cd8f8910355da9dd214627a31acfeb61ac66e13560255bfd87d3e9c50e1ca","ver" : 1,"vin_sz" : 1,"vout_sz" : 1,"lock_time" : 0,"in" : [{"prev_out" : {"hash" : "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","n" : 4294967295},"coinbase" : "040e80001c028f00"}],"out" : [{"value" : 50.51000000,"scriptPubKey" : "0x4F4BA55D1580F8C3A8A2C78E8B7963837C7EA2BD8654B9D96C51994E6FCF6E65E1CF9A844B044EEA125F26C26DBB1B207E4C3F2A098989DA9BA5BA455E830F7504 OP_CHECKSIG"}]},{"hash" : "1d5e512a9723cbef373b970eb52f1e9598ad67e7408077a82fdac194b65333c9","ver" : 1,"vin_sz" : 1,"vout_sz" : 2,"lock_time" : 0,"in" : [{"prev_out" : {"hash" : "237fe8348fc77ace11049931058abb034c99698c7fe99b1cc022b1365a705d39","n" : 0},"scriptSig" : "0xA87C02384E1F184B79C6ACF070BEA45D5B6A4739DBFF776A5D8CE11B23532DD05A20029387F6E4E77360692BB624EEC1664A21A42AA8FC16AEB9BD807A4698D0CA8CDB0021024530 0x965D33950A28B84C9C19AB64BAE9410875C537F0EB29D1D21A60DA7BAD2706FBADA7DF5E84F645063715B7D0472ABB9EBFDE5CE7D9A74C7F207929EDAE975D6B04"}],"out" : [{"value" : 92233720368.54277039,"scriptPubKey" : "OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0xB7A73EB128D7EA3D388DB12418302A1CBAD5E890 OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG"},{"value" : 92233720368.54277039,"scriptPubKey" : "OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0x151275508C66F89DEC2C5F43B6F9CBE0B5C4722C OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG"}]}],"mrkl_tree" : ["012cd8f8910355da9dd214627a31acfeb61ac66e13560255bfd87d3e9c50e1ca","1d5e512a9723cbef373b970eb52f1e9598ad67e7408077a82fdac194b65333c9","618eba14419e13c8d08d38c346da7cd1c7c66fd8831421056ae56d8d80b6ec5e"
]
}
This could be a serious problem. Bitcoin's printblock also shows it:
CBlock(hash=0000000000790ab3, ver=1, hashPrevBlock=0000000000606865, hashMerkleRoot=618eba, nTime=1281891957, nBits=1c00800e, nNonce=28192719, vtx=2)CTransaction(hash=012cd8, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=1, nLockTime=0)CTxIn(COutPoint(000000, -1), coinbase 040e80001c028f00)CTxOut(nValue=50.51000000, scriptPubKey=0x4F4BA55D1580F8C3A8A2C7)CTransaction(hash=1d5e51, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=2, nLockTime=0)CTxIn(COutPoint(237fe8, 0), scriptSig=0xA87C02384E1F184B79C6AC)CTxOut(nValue=92233720368.54275808, scriptPubKey=OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0xB7A7)CTxOut(nValue=92233720368.54275808, scriptPubKey=OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0x1512)vMerkleTree: 012cd8 1d5e51 618eba
I have a serie of questions:
  1. What is this language? which kind of language is it?
  2. the POCO i this:
''Essentially, the code for checking Bitcoin transactions did not work if outputs were so large that they overflowed when summed, and a hacker figured this out and took advantage of it. There is supposed to be a fixed maximum supply of 21 million Bitcoin, but the hacker, in a single transaction, created 8,784 times more Bitcoins than ever should exist.''

What does it mean ''did not work if outputs were so large'' ? The output of what?
so large that they overflowed when summed ...
what does this mean? can you make an example to let me understand?
The sum of what + what? And why does this sum caused a bufferoverflow? A buffer overflow isn't it when for example there is an array and then there is no definied lenght for the array and you put in more than the array may own? In this case from what is the buffer overflow caused by?
Also interstead in what does this string mean:
vMerkleTree: 012cd8 1d5e51 618eba
what does this mean?
submitted by luchins to HowToHack [link] [comments]

ELONCITY TECHNOLOGY BUILDING BLOCKS INTEGRATION

ECTP OPERATION

The ECTP specifies the algorithms and rules for an Eloncity microgrid operation. To implement this protocol, we will need software and hardware to conform to ECTP specifications. An ECTP-compliant microgrid operation consists of the following elements: • Core ECTP core energy exchange platform based on high-performance blockchain network. The Eloncity blockchain will be an enhanced Ethereum blockchain technology that has been optimized for the high-volume high-speed energy transaction. • Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) is a high-performance consensus mechanism for processing energy transaction. The public validators selected by the community will ensure the security and integrity of transactions, including execution of smart energy contracts. Eloncity’s blockchain will support over 10,000 transactions per second or 1.8 million concurrent energy exchanges at the three-minutes interval. • A versatile and optimized smart contract platform to support energy-exchange contracts amongst community members, compute real-time equilibrium energy prices for a given location on an Eloncity microgrid and conduct agreed energy exchange. • A “mining” mechanism to award ECT tokens to customers who use ECTP-compliant BESS for storing newly harvested renewable energy. The mining functions are written as long-running smart business contracts compatible with the CyberMiles virtual machine. • Universal Open Chain Access Protocol layer to support applications based on any blockchain platforms such as Bitcoin or Ethereum. This universal application interface layer will facilitate ecorich applications for Eloncity. The smart contracts based on energy exchange price equilibrium will be developed per ECTP specification and be built into the hardware components of Eloncity microgrid to enable automated energy exchange. The first hardware devices to support the ECTP is the POMCube NetZero, it is a behind-the-meter (BTM) BESS. NetZero provides a buffer for storing excess renewable electricity produced on the customer premise. NetZero can make autonomous energy exchange decisions based on its built-in AI algorithm to analyze the customer energy demand profile. The demand parameters are machine-learned by “observing” the owner’s home energy use over time, similar to how the Nest thermostat functions. With the ECTP enabled devices, such as the POMCube NetZero, deployed in sufficient number on customer premises in an Eloncity microgrid, the Eloncity microgrid will be able to achieve an optimal community energy supply-demand based on local renewable resources. In addition to the described blockchain-based cryptoeconomics protocol and BESS, the Eloncity Model also aims to provide an alternative power grid network so that the community members can exchange energy independently from the utility’s T&D networks. In an Eloncity microgrid, the DCbus performs as a switching device for managing local power flows and energy exchange. The Eloncity Model aims to maximize the utilization of the DCbus with a pair of copper wires connecting each customer premise within an Eloncity microgrid to the DCbus endpoints. Each endpoint follows the timing set by the Scheduler when sending/receiving energy to/from the DCbus and hence the pair of copper wires is no longer the best effort network. The BESS associated with each endpoint serves as ingress and egress buffer of the network, which, along with the Scheduler, prevents endpoints from overflowing or under flowing the network. An important additional benefit of the DCbus is that it saves as much as 17 percent of renewable energy as it avoids back-and-forth AC and DC conversions that are prevalent in the current centralized AC grids. The DCbus is designed to run at 1,500V to take advantage of the standard technologies widely used in existing solar farms. The DCbus operating voltage can be reduced down to 1,200V so that the maximum-peak-point-tracking (MPPT) of local solar PV charging controller can be run stable without constantly changing its power-tracking algorithm to maintain the target 1,500V. Running the DCbus at 1,200V will lose little conversion efficiency. The Foundation envisions the strategic partnership with incumbent utilities to operate their own ECTPcompliant endpoints and participate in the energy exchange with Eloncity microgrids. However, the Foundation sees ideal Eloncity Model implementation to be new ZNE community constructions14. The new construction would integrate rooftop PV, BESS, and DC system during the construction phase, which eliminates 3rd party retrofit installer, higher financial cost and redundant roof insurance typically required in building retrofits. The more streamlined PV, BESS and DC system installation process in new ZNE community construction will offer significantly more cost-competitive energy from decentralized community-based renewable energy. In summary, the Eloncity Model can be easily deployed in areas that lack the electricity grid infrastructure. In the existing built environment that already have centralized AC grids, the Foundation will collaborate closely with the local utility and local government, regional ISO and appropriate regional energy regulating agencies. The Eloncity Model holds tremendous potentials to assist the utilities to fortify the existing power grids across the globe.
submitted by shenali to Eloncity [link] [comments]

Buffer Overflow Attack - Computerphile - YouTube DC813: Malware Analysis: Buffer Overflows Sunny Wear - Part1 HOW TO RECOVERY STOLEN FUNDS(BITCOIN,ALTCOIN AND OTHER CURRENCIES) BOF01 - Buffer Overflow Win 32 bit Buffer Overflow pt 1

Notable changes Fix buffer overflow in bundled upnp. Bundled miniupnpc was updated to 1.9.20151008. This fixes a buffer overflow in the XML parser during initial network discovery. Bitcoin is an innovative payment network and a new kind of money created by Satoshi Nakamoto. His legacy is preserved on SatoshiNakamoto.me . Skip to content. Satoshi Nakamoto. Info. About; Contact; Resources. Bitcoin Whitepaper; Stats; Search; Re: Bitcoin and buffer overflow attacks. December 11, 2010 Satoshi Nakamoto Bitcoin Talk. Quote from: da2ce7 on December 11, 2010, 05:49:22 direct to ... Value overflow incident. From Bitcoin Wiki. Jump to: navigation, search. On August 15 2010, it was discovered that block 74638 contained a transaction that created 184,467,440,737.09551616 bitcoins for three different addresses. Two addresses received 92.2 billion bitcoins each, and whoever solved the block got an extra 0.01 BTC that did not exist prior to the transaction. This was possible ... A buffer overflow, just as the name implies, is an anomaly where a computer program, while writing data to a buffer, overruns it’s capacity or the buffer’s boundary and then bursts into boundaries of other buffers, and corrupts or overwrites the legitimate data present. Imagine a container designed to accommodate eight liters of liquid content, but all of a sudden, over 10 liters were ... Disclosure of the details of CVE-2017-18350, a fix for which was released on November 6th, 2017 in Bitcoin Core version 0.15.1. Technical Details. CVE-2017-18350 is a buffer overflow vulnerability which allows a malicious SOCKS proxy server to overwrite the program stack on systems with a signed char type (including common 32-bit and 64-bit x86 ...

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Buffer Overflow Attack - Computerphile - YouTube

Buffer Overflow Attack - Computerphile - Duration: 17:30. ... Bitcoin Theft And Fraud: How To Recover Your Stolen Money / [email protected] #bitcoin - Duration: 0:48. Detective Spytech 22 ... Classic Buffer Overflow attacks on two different processor architectures, one without DEP/NX Bit; ASLR and one with those memory protection features. Making yourself the all-powerful "Root" super-user on a computer using a buffer overflow attack. Assistant Professor Dr Mike Pound details how it's done. The... Buffer Overflow Primer Part 8 (Return To Libc Theory) - Duration: 13:34. ... 'Fake Bitcoin' - How this Woman Scammed the World, then Vanished - Duration: 17:50. ColdFusion Recommended for you. 17 ... This video is unavailable. Watch Queue Queue. Watch Queue Queue

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